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Introduction
Approximately 60% of fresh fruits and vegetables1 and 80% of sea-
food2 consumed in the United States are imported.  On average, 15% of the
overall U.S. food supply by volume comes from foreign countries.3  In
2007, the United States imported $85.4 billion worth of agricultural and
seafood products.4  China was the third largest food exporter to the United
States, after Canada and Mexico.5  China is also the largest exporter of
1. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (FDA), DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (HHS),
FOOD PROTECTION PLAN: AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING THE NATION’S FOOD
SUPPLY 8 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/centeroffices/
oc/officeofoperations/ucm121761.pdf [hereinafter FDA FOOD PROTECTION PLAN].
2. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (FDA), IMPORT ALERT NO. 16-131, FDA IMPORT
ALERTS (2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_33.html
[hereinafter FDA IMPORT ALERTS].
3. See FDA FOOD PROTECTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 8. R
4. GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (CRS), FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPORTS FROM CHINA 5 (updated Sept. 26, 2008), available at Order Code RL34080.
5. Id.
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seafood to the United States,6 and made up 21% of the total imported sea-
food coming into the United States in 2007.7
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates approximately
80% of the nation’s food supply,8 yet it inspects only 1% of imported
foods.9  The threat of increasing food imports and an inadequate inspec-
tion rate has portended a serious and growing risk for food-borne illness
outbreaks in the United States.
In early 2007, the recall of melamine tainted pet foods imported from
China brought significant public attention to the efficacy of the U.S. food
safety regulatory system.10  Critics asserted that the current system was
broken and incapable of protecting American consumers.11  Growing pub-
lic concern about food safety, particularly over foodstuffs made in or
sourced from China, has prompted several legislative proposals to overhaul
the U.S. food safety system.12  Under this pressure, the FDA has pursued
various measures aimed at better protecting America’s food supply, one of
which is the Action Plan for Import Safety.13
The U.S. government concedes that the FDA cannot afford to ade-
quately inspect food imports at the over 300 U.S. ports of entry.14  In
6. Id. at 5– 6.
7. Food & Water Watch, Import Alert: Government Fails Consumers, Falls Short on
Seafood Inspections (2007), available at http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/
ImportAlertJuly2007-1.pdf.
8. LISA SHAMES, DIR., NAT’L RES. AND ENV’T, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
(GAO), TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMIT-
TEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GAO-08-435T, FEDERAL OVER-
SIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY: FDA’S FOOD PROTECTION PLAN PROPOSES POSITIVE FIRST STEPS, BUT
CAPACITY TO CARRY THEM OUT IS CRITICAL 1 (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d08435t.pdf.
9. See GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (CRS), U.S. FOOD AND AGRICUL-
TURAL IMPORTS: SAFEGUARDS AND SELECTED ISSUES 1 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at 7-5700
RL34198; Alexei Barrionuevo, Food Imports Often Escape Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2007, at C1.
10. See Kelly Chen & Rosa Dunnegan-Mallat, H.R. 3610, the Food and Drug Import
Safety Act of 2007, 42 INT’L L. 1339, 1339– 40 (2008) (discussing the “enormous” media
attention given to tainted foods, including pet food, and the impact of the scandals on
FDA legislation); Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical
Examination of Food and Drug Legislation in the United States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599,
616– 17 (2009) (discussing the pet food scandal as a crisis that lead to legislation regard-
ing the FDA); Kate Paulman, Comment, See Spot Eat, See Spot Die: The Pet Food Recall of
2007, 15 ANIMAL L. 113, 126 (2008) (discussing the impact of the pet food scandal on
the FDA and the public’s concern).
11. See Caroline Smith DeWaal & David Plunkett, Building a Modern Food Safety
System for FDA Regulated Foods 3– 4 (2009) (a white paper for the Ctr. for Sci. in the
Pub. Interest), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/fswhitepaper.pdf.
12. See generally Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2749, 111th Cong.
(2009); Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 875, 111th Cong. (2009); Food
and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2009, H.R. 759, 111th Cong. (2009); Safe
Food Enforcement, Assessment, Standards, and Targeting Act of 2009, H.R. 1332, 111th
Cong. (2009); FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. (2009); see also
Part I, 1.3 B of this article.
13. See infra Part III, 3.1 of this article.
14. See STEVE SUPPAN, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, IMPORT FOOD SAFETY IN THE
TWILIGHT OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 5 (May 2008) (noting the difficulty in assessing
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searching for alternatives to physical inspections, the FDA calls for “capac-
ity building” of foreign food safety regulatory regimes.15  That is, through
bilateral agreements with China and other nations that contribute to the
bulk of food imports to the United States, the FDA intends to shift the
burden of securing the U.S. food supply onto the regulatory systems in
exporting countries.16  In essence, these measures propose to outsource
the food safety regulatory power from the United States to China and other
foreign governments.
This article argues that outsourcing regulatory power through a bilat-
eral agreement with China is unlikely to ensure the safety of imported food
for two primary reasons.  First, shifting the regulatory burden does not
present a feasible alternative to the traditional enforcement tools of out-
come-based and production-based inspections and sanctions.  With the
extensive evolution of food safety law in the United States over the past one
hundred years, these traditional tools have, for the most part, proven effec-
tive in safeguarding the American food supply.17  Moving away from physi-
cal inspections in the United States, therefore, will not only eliminate a
proven method for ensuring food safety but will also send the wrong mes-
sage to both importers and foreign manufacturers.
Second, China’s burgeoning food safety regime, based on an entirely
different culture and legal system, provides little incentive for Chinese food
manufacturers to increase production costs to comply with U.S. standards.
A mere bilateral agreement will not alter existing Chinese production prac-
tices in the absence of heightened scrutiny from the United States.  Despite
the Chinese government’s genuine efforts, many factors hamper its capac-
ity to secure food safety, such as corruption, lack of a developed regulatory
framework, environmental degradation, and the zealous pursuit of eco-
nomic miracles.
Part I of the article examines the regulatory framework for the safety
of U.S. made food, particularly the development of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), the FDA, and the traditional enforcement tools.
Part II addresses the weakened U.S. enforcement of food safety measures in
the context of food imports.  Part III considers the proposed outsourcing of
food safety regulatory power to the Chinese government.  Part IV analyzes
the inherent problems of China’s evolving food safety regime.  The article
concludes that outsourcing regulatory power to China is unwise and will
be ineffective in protecting U.S. consumers.
regulation costs and the challenges in gathering data on specific importers), available at
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountID=451&refID=102785.
15. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IMP. SAFETY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, ACTION
PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY: A ROADMAP FOR CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT 24 (Nov. 2007), avail-
able at http://importsafety.gov/report/actionplan.pdf [hereinafter ACTION PLAN FOR
IMPORT SAFETY].
16. See infra Part III of this article.
17. Critics of the current food safety regulatory framework mainly focus on institu-
tional flaws that hinder the efficiency of enforcement tools. See Part I, 1.3 of this article.
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I. Regulatory Framework for the Safety of U.S. Made Food
A. The Development of the Regulatory Framework
1. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906
In the late 19th Century, scandals involving food contamination
plagued the American food industry.18  The transition from a predomi-
nantly agricultural society to an industrial nation led to a newly urbanized
population with an insatiable appetite for cheap processed foods.19  Facing
growing demand, big business took advantage of new technologies to adul-
terate food products.20  Food manufacturers invented various ways of
deceiving consumers by adding chemicals to make deleterious foods
appear fresh and desirable.21  For years, legislators deliberated over federal
regulation of the food industry until scenes of appalling and grossly
unsanitary working conditions in meat packing factories, depicted in
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, shocked the public’s conscience.22  In
response, lawmakers enacted the Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA) and the
Meat Inspection Act (MIA) in 1906.23  The current U.S. food safety regula-
tory framework can be traced to these two laws.24
The PFDA prohibited the use in food of “any added poisonous or other
added deleterious ingredient which may render such article injurious to
health.”25  To enforce the law, the PFDA granted the Secretary of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) the authority to inspect foods26
and report violations to the proper U.S. District Attorney.27  The PFDA also
provided criminal penalties for introducing adulterated or misbranded
foods and drugs into interstate commerce.28  Similarly, the MIA granted
the USDA authority to inspect meat consumed in the U.S.29
Although Sinclair’s expose´ sparked outrage that was instrumental to
the passage of the MIA, commentators widely credited passage of the PFDA
to the much publicized experiment of Dr. Harvey Wiley.30  Wiley’s group
of volunteers— called the “poison squad”— consumed doses of chemicals
identical to those found in food preservatives.31  Dr. Wiley’s work raised
18. See BEE WILSON, SWINDLED: THE DARK HISTORY OF FOOD FRAUD, FROM POISONED
CANDY TO COUNTERFEIT COFFEE, ch. 4, Pink Margarine and Pure Ketchup 152– 212 (2008).
19. See id. at 153.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 190.
23. Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regula-
tion, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 79 (2000).
24. See id.
25. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) [hereinafter Pure
Food and Drug Act]; see id.
26. See Merrill & Francer, supra note 23, at 79. R
27. Pure Food and Drug Act, supra note 25, § 4.
28. Id. ch. 3915.
29. Merrill & Francer, supra note 23, at 79. R
30. Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn’t Enough? 120
HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2007).  For a detailed account of Dr. Wiley’s experiment, see
WILSON, supra note 18, at 188– 90. R
31. See WILSON, supra note 18, at 182– 86. R
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public awareness of the harm in adulterated and misbranded foodstuffs.32
As a result, the PFDA was also commonly referred to as the Wiley Act.33  In
1907, Dr. Wiley became the head of the Bureau of Chemistry of the
USDA,34 which became the Food and Drug Administration.35
2. The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938
Even though proponents hailed the PFDA as an important break-
through, many doubted its effectiveness due to its vague language on key
requirements.36  In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) which overhauled the regulatory framework cre-
ated under the PFDA.37  The passage of the 1938 Act resulted from the
32. Reforming the Food Safety System, supra note 30, at 1348. R
33. Id.
34. See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Food and Drug Admin, Harvey Wash-
ington Wiley, M.D., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/PastCommis-
sioners/ucm113692.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
35. Id.; see also Merrill & Francer, supra note 23, at 82 (discussing the development R
of the FDA).  The Bureau later changed its name to the Food, Drug and Insecticide
Administration and, in 1931, reorganized as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Jordan Paradise, Alison W. Tisdale, Ralph F. Hall & Efrosini Kokkoli, Evaluating Over-
sight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A Case Study of the FDA and Implications for
Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 599 (2009); see Reforming the Food Safety
System, supra note 30, at 1348.  In 1940, President Roosevelt incorporated the FDA into R
the Federal Security Agency.  Id.  Over a decade later, the FDA was moved under the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Id. In 1980, the HEW was split
into two departments: the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
Department of Education.  The FDA has remained a part of the HHS ever since.  Despite
the historical shifts from one department to another, the FDA’s ambition has consist-
ently been “to assure that the products it regulates are safe and truthfully labeled.”  Max
Sherman, Developing a Labeling Compliance Program, in THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY:
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND REGULATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 399, 399 (Nor-
man F. Estrin ed., 1990).  Throughout its over one hundred year history, however, the
FDA’s ambition has often met setbacks and defeats, especially in the regulation of
imported food and drugs.
36. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914).  The gov-
ernment asserted that the respondent adulterated its flour in violation of § 7 of the
PFDA by using nitrogen peroxide gas treatments to conceal the flour’s inferior quality.
Id. at 405.  When the government sought to condemn the flour, however, the court
denied its petition. Id. Interpreting the PFDA narrowly, the Court reasoned that, if Con-
gress intended to prohibit all foods containing added poisonous or deleterious ingredi-
ents, it would have done so in explicit terms. Id. at 410– 11.  Thus, the Court stated that
the Act “placed upon the Government the burden of establishing . . . that the added
poisonous or deleterious substances must be such as may render such article injurious
to health.” Id. at 411. Because the government failed to prove the treated flour was
actually injurious to a person’s health, the Court held that “such flour, though having a
small addition of poisonous or deleterious ingredients, may not be condemned under
the [A]ct.” Id. Thus, the PFDA required the government to prove in court that a particu-
lar ingredient was harmful in order to prevail in each case. See id. at 410– 11 (referring
to the fifth subdivision of § 7).  This onerous burden significantly hindered the govern-
ment’s ability to maintain even an image of high standards for food and drugs.
37. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301– 399 (2000)) [hereinafter Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]; PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A.
GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007) at 12– 13; Merrill &
Francer, supra note 23, at 81. R
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reported deaths of over one hundred people who had taken an untested
elixir drug, which appeared to be harmless but was in fact contaminated
with fatal substances.38  To avoid similar occurrences, the FD&C Act
required drug manufacturers to prove the safety of any new drug and to
receive FDA approval before placing it in interstate commerce.39  It also
expanded the FDA’s power to regulate food safety, by authorizing FDA
inspections of food manufacturing facilities and products,40 establishing
safety tolerances for unavoidable contaminants, and creating labeling stan-
dards.41  Most importantly, the FD&C Act required courts to focus on the
character of added substances and the conditions under which a product
was manufactured.42  Thus, the Act greatly enhanced the FDA’s enforce-
ment power by eliminating the government’s burden to prove in food safety
cases the causal link between added substances and injuries to human
health.
Since its passage, Congress has amended the FD&C Act numerous
times.43  Many of the updates attempted to strike a balance between food
safety and the food industry’s pursuit of economic efficiency.44  For exam-
ple, with growing public concern over the use of pesticides in agricultural
production, the 1954 Pesticide Chemicals Amendment to the Act set toler-
ance levels for their use instead of completely prohibiting the use of pesti-
cides.45  Similarly, the 1938 Act prohibited even trace levels of chemicals,
which were deleterious in the absolute sense but relatively harmless when
in the proper amount.46  The Amendment of 1958 rolled back the 1938
Act’s harsh treatment of food additives and made way for advancements in
food preservation.47
38. SCHUMANN, ET AL., Food Safety Law 7 (1997); see Merrill & Francer, supra note
23, at 81. R
39.  SCHUMANN, ET AL., supra note 38, at 7; Merrill & Francer, supra note 23, at R
81– 82.
40. Merrill & Francer, supra note 23, at 81– 82. R
41. Id. at 82.
42. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974).  The government
sought an injunction against the distributors of smoked fish containing the residues of
dichloro diphenyl trichloroethane (DDT), a synthetic pesticide. See id. The defending dis-
tributors argued that the government could not prevail unless it proved that the DDT
residues in its smoked fish made their product unfit for human consumption or other-
wise injurious to health. See id. at 724 & n.29.  The court held that DDT residues in the
smoked fish were a “food additive” and that because the fish were not protected by any
established tolerance for the inclusion of DDT, the fish were adulterated as a matter of
law. See id. at 723– 24.  On appeal, the Court affirmed the order granting a permanent
injunction in favor of the government. See id. at 726.
43. JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 3:5 (3d ed. 2007).
44. See id. § 3:5, at 3-19 (“Whether this supposition is true, the presence of the detail
suggests anxiety about arbitrary administrative practice on the part of the FDA, a linger-
ing suspicion growing out of the 1938 Act’s encounter with the apple-growing
industry.”).
45. Id.
46. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
47. See Food Additives Amendment, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348 (1958); O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 3:6, at 3-20 (“After extensive hearings revealed a R
need to improve the regulatory process in the food-additive area, preapproval testing
before marketing additives was the means selected.”).
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3. Other Laws and Agencies that Regulate Food Safety
This article primarily focuses on the FDA because it is the main U.S.
party to the food safety agreement with the Chinese government.48  The
FDA “is responsible for ensuring the safety of roughly 80 percent of the
U.S. food supply, including $417 billion worth of domestic food and $49
billion in imported food annually.”49  In addition to the FDA, fifteen other
federal agencies are responsible for different aspects of food safety man-
dated by thirty principal laws.50  The following three agencies are worth
mentioning:
a) The United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) regulates the nation’s commercial supply
of meat, poultry, and egg products.51
b) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) “leads fed-
eral efforts to gather data on foodborne illnesses, investigate food-
borne illnesses and outbreaks, and monitor the effectiveness of
prevention and control efforts in reducing foodborne illnesses.
CDC also plays a key role in building state and local health depart-
ment epidemiology, laboratory, and environmental health capacity
to support foodborne disease surveillance and outbreak
response.”52
c) The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the use of
pesticides.53  It is responsible both for pre-market registration of
new pesticides and for “re-registration of older pesticides to ensure
that they meet current scientific standards.”54  Authorized by the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, the EPA has undertaken “a
comprehensive review of tolerances for pesticide residues in food,
with an emphasis on increasing protection for infants and children
as well as other vulnerable groups.”55
B. The Enforcement Tools that Keep U.S. Made Food Safe
In practice, the enforcement of the FD&C Act consists of two general
approaches: the outcome-based approach and the production-based
48. See infra Part III of this paper.
49. SHAMES, supra note 8, at 1. R
50. Id. at 1; ROBERT A. ROBINSON, MANAGING DIR., NAT’L RES. AND ENV’T, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL
WORKFORCE AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, GAO-05-549T, OVERSEEING THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: STEPS SHOULD BE
TAKEN TO REDUCE OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 3 (May 17, 2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05549t.pdf.
51. See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Selected Federal Agencies with a
Role in Food Safety, http://www.foodsafety.gov/about/federal/index.html (last visited
Mar. 17, 2010).
52. Id.
53. See Envtl Prot. Agency, Pesticides: Topical & Chemical Fact Sheets, http://www.
epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/securty.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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approach.56  When feasible, the FDA uses the outcome-based approach to
screen the end results of production.  Primarily under this approach, all
end products that pass FDA inspection would be safe for consumption,
assuming that the FDA could adequately inspect all end products and also
effectively test for all major safety problems.  Outcome-based enforcement
tools also include the use of criminal prosecutions, disbarment, seizures,
injunctions, voluntary recalls, warning letters, and negative publicity.  In
addition, the FDA applies the production-based approach to focus on key
steps in a product’s manufacturing process.  This approach depends on a
presumption that end products will be safe if producers follow FDA desig-
nated and proven-safe procedures.  Production-based enforcement tools
consist of Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) and Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP).
1. Factory Inspections
In the context of regulating U.S. made food, most remedial measures
are taken following FDA inspection of food factories.57  Therefore, the
FDA’s power to conduct factory inspections is crucial to securing food
safety.  The FD&C Act authorizes FDA personnel to enter and conduct an
inspection of a food manufacturer’s warehouse, factory, or other loca-
tion.58  The FDA has wide discretion to decide when and how to conduct
inspections.59  In fact, courts rarely interfere with the FDA’s inspection
power unless the inspected firm can demonstrate unreasonableness.60
The coverage of an FDA inspection may vary to suit its particular pur-
pose.61  If the FDA has reason to believe that an article of food is adulter-
56. See infra Part I, 1.2(A)– 1.2(G); see generally WILSON, supra note 18 (discussing R
various enforcement tools that the FDA uses).
57. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2009):
§ 374 Inspection:
(a) Right of agents to enter; scope of inspection; notice; promptness; exclusions.
(1) For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or employees duly des-
ignated by the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials and a written
notice to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, are authorized (A) to enter, at
reasonable times, any factory, warehouse, or establishment in which food,
drugs, devices, or cosmetics are manufactured, processed, packed, or held, for
introduction into interstate commerce or after such introduction, or to enter any
vehicle being used to transport or hold such food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics
in interstate commerce; and (B) to inspect, at reasonable times and within rea-
sonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such factory, warehouse, establish-
ment, or vehicle and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials,
containers, and labeling therein.
See also U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Investigation Operations Manual (2009), available
at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/ucm124442.htm (“Mission: Protecting
consumers and enhances [sic] public health by maximizing compliance of FDA-regu-
lated products and minimizing risk associated with those products.”).
58. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 704(a)(A).
59. O’Reilly, supra note 43, § 20:6, at 20-22.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 20:4, at 20-17 (“There are three principal types of FDA inspections; com-
prehensive, abbreviated, and directed inspections. The types of inspection conducted
vary according to their purpose.”).
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ated and presents a serious health threat to humans or animals, an
inspection can extend to all records related to the manufacturing, process-
ing, packing, distribution, receipt, holding, or importation of the article, in
any format (including hardcopy and electronic), and at any location.62
The FDA usually does not have to present a warrant and normally
conducts an inspection with the consent of the inspected firm.63  Refusal
of entry, however, can result in serious consequences.64  Upon refusal, an
FDA official would certainly obtain a warrant to complete the inspection.65
If the owner then refuses a warranted search, the U.S. Marshals can arrest
him on the scene.66  According to § 374(a), refusing a legitimate inspection
request is a criminal violation of the FD&C Act punishable with up to one
year of imprisonment and a fine of up to $1,000.67  In addition, the FDA
can use the refusal as the basis for a civil action against the owner, which
may result in seizure or an injunction.68  Forcible actions against inspec-
tors can also lead to criminal punishment.69
2. Criminal Sanctions
Criminal enforcement of the FD&C Act is the least utilized sanction.70
The threat of imposing criminal sanctions, however, can provide a level of
deterrence and thus secure food quality and safety.71  Given the complex-
ity of modern food making processes, imposing criminal liability depends
on the underlying theory that consumers cannot protect themselves even
by exercising the utmost of care.  Thus, public interest in the purity of food
justifies the idea that food manufacturers must be held to the highest stan-
dards of care.72  Hence, in theory, criminal liability can force food makers
to conform to the FD&C Act even when they are not under constant FDA
oversight.  This idea is consistent with the notion of industry self-regula-
tion.73  With limited resources, the FDA cannot realistically monitor the
increasingly massive and sophisticated food industry; therefore, the possi-
62. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 414(a), 21 U.S.C. § 350c.
63. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 20:1, at 20-3. R
64. See id.
65. Id. § 20:12, at 20-32.
66. Id. § 20:1, at 20-4.
67. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(f), 333(a)(1), 374(a); O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 20:14, at R
20-34.
68. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 20:1, at 20-3. R
69. Id. § 20:12, at 20-32.
70. Id. § 8:1, at 8-2.
71. See, e.g., Sam D. Fine, The Philosophy of Enforcement, 31 FOOD DRUG. COSM. L.J.
324, 325– 26 (1976) (illustrating how after criminally prosecuting two pecan shellers, an
independent sheller approached Mr. Fine saying, “ ‘Tell me what I have to do, Mr. Fine— I
don’t want to go to jail.’ ”).
72. U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (“The public interest in the purity of its
food is so great as to warrant the imposition of the highest standard of care on distribu-
tors.”) (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959)).
73. See, e.g., Luke McFarland, Insufficient FDA Resources: Leveling the Playing Field
and Reducing Fraud by Altering Incentives 22-24 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author), available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/372/McFarland.
pdf.
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bility of imposing criminal liability remains an indispensable means of
enforcement.
“Most violations of the FD&C Act potentially carry criminal penal-
ties.”74  Not every such violation, however, actually requires criminal liabil-
ity.  The FDA has discretion to decide whether to prosecute a particular
violation.75  In deciding whether to pursue criminal charges, the FDA usu-
ally considers the following factors: “continuing violations of law (e.g., con-
tinuing insanitary conditions in a food plant); violations of an obvious and
flagrant nature (e.g., food warehouse overrun with rodents, birds and
insects, which contains plainly contaminated products); and intentionally
false or fraudulent violations.”76
One distinctive feature of criminal liability under the FD&C Act is its
standard of “strict liability.”77  That is, a person in charge of a food manu-
facturer that violates certain provisions of the Act can be held criminally
liable without the government proving the mens rea “typically required in
Anglo-American criminal law.”78  In this context, strict liability applies
where the person in charge had a “responsible relation” to a violation of the
FD&C Act.79  In U.S. v. Park,80 the Court explained the reason why indi-
viduals who had a “responsible relationship” to the regulated products
should be held to the highest standard of care:
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corpo-
rate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they
are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who
voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose ser-
vices and products affect the health and well-being of the public that sup-
ports them.81
74. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 37, at 1310. R
75. Id. at 1319.
76. Id.
77. See Joseph E. Cole, Environmental Criminal Liability: What Federal Officials Know
(or Should Know) Can Hurt Them, 54 A.F.L. REV. 1, 6– 7 (2004) (“For statutes concerned
with public health, safety, and welfare, however, courts have taken a different view.  Gen-
erally, a public welfare statute without a standard for culpability will require the govern-
ment to only prove the defendant had the responsibility and had either the authority to
prevent or the ability to remedy a violation; the government does not have to show that
the individual had the intent to violate the law or even any knowledge of the violation.”).
78. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 37, at 1310. R
79. Id.
80. See U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975).  In this case, the FDA inspections
revealed that Acme Markets had persistent problems with rat infestations in food storage
areas.  The FDA repeatedly urged the company’s CEO, Mr. John R. Park, to correct the
violations.  Mr. Park directed his subordinates to address the issues, which they did, but
the infestations continued.  At trial, Mr. Park was criminally fined $250.  Mr. Park
appealed the decision asserting that he could not have done anything more than what
his subordinates had done.  Affirming the trial court’s decision, the Court concluded
that “[Mr. Park] had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of, and that he failed to do so.” Id. at 673– 74.
81. Id. at 672.
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Like the Sword of Damocles, the criminal “responsible relationship”
test— albeit rarely used— exists as “a formidable tool” for FDA enforce-
ment.82  The criminal penalties for a single offense under the FD&C Act
may consist of a year in jail and a $100,000 fine.83  If the violation caused
death, the fine may reach $250,000.84  If the defendant is also convicted of
wire fraud, mail fraud, or conspiracy, additional sanctions may apply.  In
fact, the maximum fine for multiple counts from a single event may reach
$500,000.85  Additionally, the court may order the offender to cover the
FDA’s investigation expenses.86
3. Seizures
Another FDA enforcement tool is government seizure of adulterated or
misbranded food products.87  Like criminal sanctions, seizure provides lev-
erage for the FDA to pressure a firm to take appropriate actions to elimi-
nate or prevent foodborne harm to the public.88  To avoid seizure
proceedings, firms usually opt for voluntary recalls of their potentially
harmful products.89
During an FDA site inspection, the FDA may seize products because
the FDA believes that the manufacturer’s products possess an immediate
injury potential.90  To initiate a seizure, the FDA works with a local U.S.
attorney to file a complaint against the suspect products in federal district
court.91  After a court clerk signs the complaint, the FDA can then send
U.S. Marshals to seize the property.92
A seizure action is more drastic than a regular civil action because it is
executed according to admiralty procedures rather than standard civil pro-
cedures.93  As a result, a seizure action may be conducted in rem against
the defective products themselves and not against the owner of the prod-
82. O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 8:5, at 8-16. R
83. See 21 U.S.C. § 333; Id. § 8:25, at 8-42.
84. O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 8:25, at 8-42. R
85. Id.
86. Id. § 8:26, at 8-44.
87. See U.S. Marshals Seize Sanitizer for Bacteria Problems, ABC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2009,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090802/ap_on_go_ot/us_sanitizer_seizure  (giving a
recent example of the FDA’s seizure of medical devices).
88. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601 (1950) (“Congress
weighed the potential injury to the public from misbranded articles against the injury to
the purveyor of the article from a temporary interference with its distribution and
decided in favor of the speedy, preventive device of multiple seizures.”).
89. See Eugene I. Lambert, Recalls, Regulatory Letters and Publicity, 31 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 360, 360 (1976) (“Recalls perhaps can be characterized as do-it-yourself
seizure actions.”).
90. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 7:4, at 7-15– 16 (recognizing that another possible R
reason for seizure is dispute over nomenclature for ingredients).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 7:4, at 7-16.
93. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act  § 304(b), 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2006):
§ 334(b) Procedure; multiplicity of pending proceedings:
The article, equipment, or other thing proceeded against shall be liable to
seizure by process pursuant to the libel, and the procedure in cases under this
section shall conform, as nearly as may be, to the procedure in admiralty; except
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ucts.94  Accordingly, a seizure action involves no party in opposition to the
FDA.  Additionally, procedures for these cases require no pre-seizure hear-
ing, nor do they entitle the owner to any prior judicial finding of probable
cause.95  Instead, cases have held that a post-seizure hearing is sufficient.96
Courts tend to accord the FDA great deference and often resolve challenges
of seizures in the FDA’s favor.97
4. Voluntary Recalls
A recall is a means of removing consumer products from the market
that violate the FD&C Act.98  However, the FD&C Act does not explicitly
authorize the FDA to conduct recalls of food products, except baby
formula.99  In practice, the FDA acquired the power to facilitate recalls by
threatening to use other statutorily authorized enforcement methods, such
as seizures and injunctions, to force manufacturers and distributors to
remove their harmful food products from the market.100  Thus, voluntary
recalls are essentially “do-it-yourself seizure actions.”101
that on demand of either party any issue of fact joined in any such case shall be
tried by jury.
94. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 7:5, at 7-22 (“Once the claimant [the owner of the R
seized goods] files the claim, the legal jurisdiction of the court changes from in rem
jurisdiction over the product into in personam jurisdiction over the person or company
who made the claim.”).
95. See id. § 7:3, at 7-9.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(a) (2009):
Recall is an effective method of removing or correcting consumer products that
are in violation of laws administered by the Food and Drug Administration.
Recall is a voluntary action that takes place because manufacturers and distribu-
tors carry out their responsibility to protect the public health and well-being
from products that present a risk of injury or gross deception or are otherwise
defective.
See also O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 21:1; Lambert, supra note 89, at 360. R
99. Through later amendments, the FDA acquired authority to conduct mandatory
recalls in certain areas.  FD&C Act § 535(f) gives the FDA power to mandate the repur-
chase, repair, or replacement of radiation-emitting electronic products.  21 U.S.C.
§ 360ll(f) (2006).  FD&C Act § 315(d) gives the FDA the power to order recall of a bio-
logical product that presents an imminent or substantial hazard to public health.  21
U.S.C. § 262(d) (2006).  The Infant Formula Act of 1980 added current FD&C Act
§ 412(f), directing the FDA to prescribe the scope and extent of recalls of infant formu-
las.  21 U.S.C. § 350a(f) (2006).  FD&C Act § 518(e) requires the FDA to order cessa-
tion of the distribution of medical devices in situations where there is a “reasonable
probability that a device intended for human use would cause serious, adverse health
consequences or death.”  21 U.S.C. § 360h(e) (2006); see also HUTT, MERRILL & GROSS-
MAN, supra note 37, at 1304 (describing in detail the FDA’s statutory power to conduct R
recalls).
100. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 21:1 at 21-3 (An FDA commissioner described the R
development of food recall this way: “There were some episodes of poisoning.  We put
out a public warning about them, and the next question was to the company: Are you
going to get it off the market or shall we seize it?  And from that beginning the recall
system grew.”) (quoting Recall Procedures of the Food and Drug Administration: Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations, House Governmental Operations Comm.,
91st Cong. (2d Sess. 1971)).
101. Lambert, supra note 89, at 360. R
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In 1978, the FDA issued guidelines on recall policy, procedures and
industry responsibility.102  Under the current guidelines, recalls take two
forms: firm initiated or FDA initiated recalls.103  A firm initiated recall
occurs any time a firm voluntarily removes its product from the market on
its own initiative or upon FDA request.104  The FDA does not consider
such an action a recall, however, if a firm merely retrieves its products for
reasons other than violating the FD&C Act, or if the recall is due to a
“minor or technical violation of the laws which the FDA administers.”105
This distinction is important because the FDA issues public alerts for most
recalls, which can negatively impact a firm’s reputation.106  Alternatively,
an FDA initiated recall occurs only in urgent situations or when a firm
refuses to initiate a recall upon FDA request.107  In either type of recall, the
FDA assumes the supervisory role108 and the recalling firm assumes pri-
mary responsibility for removing the unsafe products.109
During the consideration or administration of a recall, the FDA evalu-
ates the product’s potential health hazard.110  According to the seriousness
102. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.41– 7.59 (2009) (incorporating the guidelines with the most
recent updates and amendments).
103. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(b) (2009).
104. Id. § 7.40(a).
105. O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 21:2, at 21-6. R
106. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.50 (2009) (also stating that under certain circumstances, the
FDA “will intentionally delay public notification of recalls of certain drugs and devices
where the agency determines that public notification may cause unnecessary and harm-
ful anxiety in patients and that initial consultation between patients and their physi-
cians is essential.”); see also O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 21:2, at 21-7 (discussing the R
potential implications of the term “recall”).
107. 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40(b), 7.45 (2009).
108. Id. § 7.46(b).
109. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 21:2, at 21-6 (“A recall is the removal or correction R
of a marketed product by a responsible firm.”).
110. 21 C.F.R. § 741(a) (2009):
An evaluation of the health hazard presented by a product being recalled or
considered for recall . . .  will take into account, but need not be limited to, the
following factors:
(1) Whether any disease or injuries have already occurred from the use of the
product.
(2) Whether any existing conditions could contribute to a clinical situation that
could expose humans or animals to a health hazard. Any conclusion shall be
supported as completely as possible by scientific documentation and/or state-
ments that the conclusion is the opinion of the individual(s) making the health
hazard determination.
(3) Assessment of hazard to various segments of the population, e.g., children,
surgical patients, pets, livestock, etc., who are expected to be exposed to the
product being considered, with particular attention paid to the hazard to those
individuals who may be at greatest risk.
(4) Assessment of the degree of seriousness of the health hazard to which the
populations at risk would be exposed.
(5) Assessment of the likelihood of occurrence of the hazard.
(6) Assessment of the consequences (immediate or long-range) of occurrence of
the hazard.
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of the health hazard posed to the public, the FDA “assign[s] the recall a
classification, i.e., Class I, Class II, or Class III, to indicate the relative
degree of health hazard.”111  Additionally, either the agency in an FDA ini-
tiated recall, or the recalling firm in a firm initiated recall, must develop a
detailed strategy and submit it for FDA approval.112  Along with a general
assessment of the violation and the approaches the firm will take to resolve
the food-borne threat, the strategy must specify how the firm will relay
important information to the public and how it will conduct checks on the
recall’s effectiveness.113  Moreover, recalling firms must keep the FDA
informed regarding the recall’s status.114  Because public awareness is
essential in preventing further harm, the FDA will ordinarily issue public
warnings to alert consumers about the health hazard.115  The FDA will also
post public notifications of recalls in its weekly FDA Enforcement Report
on the FDA website, providing a descriptive listing of each new recall
according to its classification.116
5. Good Manufacturing Practices Regulation (GMP)
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) provide operational guidance to
FDA regulated industries through the dissemination of systems-oriented
requirements information for quality control and compliance.117  GMP
represents a shift from a system of discovering unsafe products after pro-
duction to a system of monitoring the production process proactively to
prevent violations and ensure safe results.118  In the 1960s, the FDA began
to standardize production procedures in certain industries.119  To institute
GMP— much like it instituted facilitated recalls— the FDA leverages statuto-
rily authorized tools to effectively induce industries to self-regulate.120
The FDA’s rule making authority made it possible for a broad interpre-
tation of the FD&C Act regarding the prohibition of “insanitary condi-
tions.”  Section 402(a) states: “A food shall be deemed to be adulterated . . .
(4) if it has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions
whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may
111. Id. § 7.41(b).
112. Id. § 7.46(a).
113. See generally id. § 7.42.
114. See id. § 7.46(a).
115. See id. § 7.50.
116. See id.
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2009) (“The authority to promulgate regulations for the
efficient enforcement of this Act, except as otherwise provided in this section, is vested
in the Secretary [of Health and Human Services (HHS)].”); 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2006)
(“A food shall be deemed to be adulterated . . . (4) if it has been prepared, packed, or
held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth,
or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health . . . .”); 21 C.F.R. pt. 110.5
(2008).
118. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 23:1, at 23-2. R
119. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 23:1, at 23-2 (“GMPs gained their first statutory R
power from the 1962 drug amendments, and the FDA later received full and detailed
authority over medical device manufacturing practices in the 1976 Medical Device
Amendments.”).
120. See id. § 23:1, at 23-3.
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have been rendered injurious to health . . . .”121  Congress, however, fell
short of defining within the Act what exactly “insanitary condition”
meant.122  Construing the provision in its favor, the FDA seized the oppor-
tunity to define the term “insanitary conditions” by promulgating detailed
GMP regulations.123  As codified in 21 C.F.R. Part 110, the GMP regula-
tions standardize production procedures in certain industries.124  Essen-
tially, any given GMP provides an FDA inspection benchmark to measure
for an insanitary condition.  From an enforcement point of view, GMP ben-
efits both the FDA and the regulated industries.  By checking production
processes, GMP enables the FDA to find violations at an early stage and
thus prevent the public from being injured in the first place.  From an
industry perspective, GMP provides certainty by specifying what to expect
from an FDA inspection.
Although the FD&C Act does not specifically authorize GMP, courts
have generally supported the FDA’s interpretation of “insanitary condi-
tions” in light of the compelling interest in public safety.  In United States v.
Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.,125 the defendant challenged the FDA’s
authority to enforce GMP.  The court held that “[t]he public interest will
not permit invalidation simply on the basis of a lack of delegated statutory
authority in this case.”126
6. Tort Litigation
No provisions in the FD&C Act expressly authorize a private cause of
action, and “the Supreme Court declared that only the federal government
may enforce the FD&C Act.”127  Thus, a citizen cannot function as a pri-
vate attorney general to supplement enforcement of the FD&C Act.128  A
private party injured by unsafe food, however, can bring a common law
tort claim against the manufacturer.129  As a result, tort litigation provides
another important tool to compel industries to ensure food safety.130  The
threat of tort litigation is akin to an outcome-based enforcement approach
because tort liability can only be imposed after the harm has occurred.
121. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 402(a)(4), 21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4) (2006)
(emphasis added).
122. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 23:2, at 23-6. R
123. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 110
124. Id.
125. U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
126. Id. at 248.
127. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 37, at 1467. R
128. Id. at 1464.
129. See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 460– 64 (2005).
130. See James T. O’Reilly, Are We Cutting the GRAS? Food Safety Perceptions are
Diminished by Dysfunctional  Bureaucratic Silos, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 421 (2004)
(“Liability litigation avoidance is an important, disciplining factor in the safety decisions
made by food processors.”).
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II. Reforming the Food Safety System
A. The Scope of the Problem
Each year, there are approximately seventy-six million cases of food-
borne illnesses resulting in 325,000 hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths in
the United States.131  As a result, the FDA has been under constant criti-
cism for its failure to reduce outbreaks.132  Some commentators, however,
point out that the blame is largely misplaced because the FDA is substan-
tially underfunded.133  While the FDA’s responsibility continues to
expand, its budget actually decreases in relevant terms.134  An FDA analy-
sis indicated that, “ ‘[a]s long as the resources available to FDA do not keep
up with the realities of increasing costs . . . it is increasingly difficult for
FDA to perform in a way that meets public expectations.’”135  Due to this
lack of funding, the number of inspections of domestic food processing
facilities has dropped from 50,000 in 1972 to less than 10,000 in 2006, a
drop of more than 80%.136  Even with the assistance of states, the FDA can
only inspect 9% of the 210,000 food establishments each year.137  With
decreasing inspection rates, outbreaks of food-borne illnesses have
increased rapidly.138
B. The Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009
In response to recent food poisoning epidemics, the legislature has
proposed several bills to improve food safety.139  On July 30, 2009, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed the Food Safety Enhancement Act (FSEA),
which is currently pending in the U.S. Senate.140  The FSEA proposes
major amendments to the FD&C Act.141
131. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., FOODBORNE ILLNESS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2005), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/files/foodborne_illness_FAQ.pdf; see
also REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, H.R.,
FACT SHEET: WEAKNESSES IN FDA’S FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM 1 (Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20061101115143-67937.pdf.
132. See, e.g., DeWaal & Plunkett, supra note 11 (criticizing the FDA and calling for R
reform).
133. See William Hubbard, Wrongly Blaming the FDA, WASH. POST, May 8, 2006, at
A19.
134. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Spinach Scare’s Larger Warning: Tight FDA Budgets Have
Cut Produce Inspection. Compliance with Safety Rules is Voluntary, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 22,
2006, at A1.
135. Id.
136. See WAXMAN, supra note 131, at 2; Hubbard, supra note 133. R
137. See WAXMAN, supra note 131, at 3. R
138. See DeWaal & Plunkett, supra note 11. R
139. See Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 875, 111th Cong. (2009); Food
and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2009, H.R. 759, 111th Cong. (2009); Safe
Food Enforcement, Assessment, Standards, and Targeting Act of 2009, H.R. 1332, 111th
Cong. (2009); FDA Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. (2009).
140. See Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. (2009).
141. See COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R., 111TH CONG., SECTION-BY-SECTION
SUMMARY OF H.R. 2749, THE FOOD SAFETY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2009 (July 2009), availa-
ble at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090729/hr2749_sectionsum-
mary.pdf.
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1. Enhancing Production-based Enforcement Tools
The FSEA emphasizes production-based supervision.  First, the FSEA
would require that food facilities register with the FDA and pay a $500
annual registration fee.142  In addition, the FSEA would obligate food facili-
ties to provide contact information, the primary purpose of their establish-
ments, and all the trade names under which their facilities conduct
business.143  It would authorize the FDA to suspend registration if a food
manufacturer has violated the law in a way that is likely to cause a serious
health hazard or death.144  Second, the FSEA would require food facilities
to develop and implement a food safety plan.  Food facilities would be
required to conduct a hazard analysis and take preventative measures to
ensure food safety.145  The law would require the FDA to identify and pub-
lish the “most significant food-borne contaminants and the most signifi-
cant resulting hazards” every two years.146  Third, the FSEA would set a
risk-based inspection schedule and authorize the FDA to gain access to
food facility records.147  It would mandate that the FDA randomly inspect
high-risk (category 1) facilities every six to twelve months; low risk (cate-
gory 2) facilities every eighteen to thirty-six months; and facilities that hold
food (category 3) every five years.148  The FDA would be required to make
an annual report to Congress on the inspections of food facilities.149  Fur-
thermore, the FSEA would require the FDA to establish a tracing system
that would keep track of the origin and distribution history of every food
product it regulates.150  In the context of imports, the FSEA would man-
date that imported foods be accompanied by a valid certificate verifying
that the foods comply with the FD&C Act.151
2. Enhancing Outcome-based Enforcement Tools
Additionally, the FSEA addresses outcome-based enhancements.  First,
it would authorize the FDA to conduct mandatory recalls of adulterated or
misbranded products.152  In addition, the FSEA would increase detention
of foods suspected of being adulterated or misbranded from thirty days to
sixty days.153  Second, the FSEA would increase prison terms from one to
ten years for knowing violations of the FD&C Act’s provisions concerning
misbranded or adulterated food.154
142. Id. at 3.
143. Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2749 § 101(b)(3).
144. Id. §§ 101(b)(4)– 101(b)(5).
145. Id. § 102.
146. Id. § 103(b).
147. Id. § 106.
148. Id. § 105(a).
149. Id. § 105(b).
150. Id. § 107.
151. Id. § 109.
152. Id. § 111(b).
153. See 21 U.S.C. § 334(h) (2006); Id. § 132.
154. See 21 U.S.C. § 333; Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2749 § 134.
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While it is unclear whether the U.S. Senate will pass the FSEA, or
other proposed bills on food safety, these efforts show that lawmakers are
concerned with the effect inadequate funding is having on the application
of traditional outcome-based and production-based enforcement tools.
With over a hundred years of practice, the two enforcement tools, when
properly funded, have proven relatively effective in ensuring food safety.
III. The FDA’s Weakened Enforcement in the Context of Food
Imports
Although the public is frustrated with the enforcement of the FD&C
Act in the domestic food context, it is even more enraged that enforcement
for imported foods is even weaker.155  The following section explores the
hurdles that have prevented both outcome-based and production-based
enforcement from producing a deterrent effect on foreign food
manufacturers.
A. FDA’s Refusal of Entry
Theoretically, the FDA “has broad power to inspect, detain, and refuse
entry to imported products”156 within its jurisdiction.157  Since the FDA
need not prove that goods are actually adulterated, only that they appear to
be adulterated, the standard to justify refusal is low.158  The FDA may set
terms for the relabeling or reconditioning of goods and may even order
owners to destroy their goods.159  Legal challenges to FDA refusals of entry
are difficult and courts usually “decline to intrude on [the FDA’s]
discretion.160
B. Weakened Enforcement
Ironically, the FDA’s broad power to regulate foreign products does
not result in safe imports.161  In practice, the FDA is unable to fully utilize
either the outcome-based or production-based tools to regulate imported
food due to lack of resources.162
1. Weakened Outcome-based Tools
Over the last decade, the United States experienced a rapid increase in
the import of agricultural and seafood products.  From 1997 to 2007, the
import value of these products increased by 94%, growing in overall value
155. See DeWaal & Plunkett, supra note 11, at 3. R
156. O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 28:1, at 28-1 R
157. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 801(a), 21 U.S.C. 381(a) ; O’REILLY,
supra note 43, § 28:3, at 28-3. R
158. See Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act § 801(a); O’REILLY, supra note 43, R
§ 28:3, at 28-3.
159. See O’REILLY, supra note 43, § 28:2, at 28-3. R
160. Id. § 28:3, at 28-3.
161. See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, FDA Was Aware of Dangers to Food, WASH. POST,
Apr. 23, 2007, at A1.
162. See generally WAXMAN, supra note 131. R
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from $43 billion to $83.6 billion.163  By volume, the increase was 35%
during the same period.164  Despite the dramatic increase of imported agri-
cultural and seafood products, the FDA’s budget has not increased propor-
tionally.165  In 2007, the FDA had only 450 inspectors scattered over 300
ports of entry.166  As a result, the FDA was only able to conduct physical
inspections of just over 1% of food imports.167  A Congressional study
revealed that FDA inspectors in San Francisco have an average of only
thirty seconds to decide whether they should subject a particular shipment
from abroad to further intensive investigation.168  Without adequate
inspections, the outcome-based tools, such as seizure and injunction, sim-
ply cannot be relied on to deter foreign producers from sending harmful
food to the United States.
2. Weakened Production-based Tools
Production-based tools are even further weakened in the context of
imports.  Without regular periodic audits, foreign factories are not likely to
take the GMP or the HACCP processes seriously because compliance with
these procedures requires additional costs.169  The appallingly low inspec-
tion rate at ports of entry has further emboldened foreign firms to cut cor-
ners without worrying about detection.170  Even if the FDA acquires the
right, mainly through bilateral agreements with foreign governments, to
inspect foreign food manufacturers, it cannot realistically afford to inspect
them as frequently as it inspects U.S. firms due to limited resources.171  In
addition, cultural and linguistic barriers add to the difficulties the FDA
faces in conducting efficient inspections of foreign manufacturers.  In
2008, in response to deaths caused by Heparin, a blood thinner, the FDA
inspected a plant in China that they believed produced the faulty prod-
ucts.172  It later turned out that the FDA had inspected the wrong plant,
163. BECKER, supra note 9, at 1. R
164. Id.
165. See WAXMAN, supra note 131, at 1. R
166. BECKER, supra note 9, at 4. R
167. Id.
168. See Diminished Capacity: Can the FDA Assure the Safety and Security of the
Nation’s Food Supply?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 377 (2007); Renea Merle &
Michael Abramowitz, FDA Faulted in Safety Lapse: White House Orders Study of Imports,
WASH. POST, July 18, 2007, at D1.
169. See, e.g., The Heparin Disaster: Chinese Counterfeits and American Failures: Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 110th Cong. 4  (2008) [hereinafter The Heparin Disaster] (describing how more
frequent inspections and audits of Chinese factories could have prevented the Heparin
Disaster).
170. FDA SCIENCE BOARD, SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FDA SCIENCE AND
MISSION AT RISK 21 (2007).
171. See DeWaal & Plunkett, supra note 11, at 4, 12 (describing the FDA’s lack of R
resources as well as proposed and pending legislation calling for inspection of foreign
plants).
172. See The Heparin Disaster, supra note 169, at 2. R
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which bore a name similar to that of the real perpetrator.173
Furthermore, unannounced audits or inspections of foreign facilities
are almost impossible to conduct because the FDA can only access the
facilities with the “permission of the foreign government.”174  During the
pet food scandal of 2007, the FDA intended to inspect the suspected facto-
ries in China.175  The Chinese government deliberately delayed the FDA
inspectors’ visas.176  One report stated that when the inspectors finally
reached the two suspected plants in southern China, one plant had already
been bulldozed and the other one was deserted.177  According to another
report, the owner of the factory not only bulldozed the building, but also
deeply plowed the ground to ensure that U.S. inspectors would not find
any trace of melamine.178
C. Challenges of Suing Chinese Manufacturers in the United States
U.S. tort litigation does not provide effective deterrence to Chinese
food manufacturers for several reasons.  First, it is difficult to identify the
manufacturer that produced the faulty food products.179  The Chinese
food industry is highly fragmented, with numerous small firms scattered
around the country.180  Market transactions in China are often conducted
on a cash basis, which makes it impossible to trace the origin of prod-
ucts.181  Many imports coming into the United States bear only “Made in
China” labels without specifying the name of the manufacturer.182  Identi-
fying a Chinese manufacturer can be a time consuming and expensive
undertaking, especially for a private party.183
Second, even if the plaintiff is able to identify the Chinese food manu-
facturer, he may find that obtaining evidence in China is a daunting task.
Rule 28(b) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure spells out a number
173. Marc Kaufman, FDA Says it Approved the Wrong Drug Plant, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,
2008, at A1.
174.  See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 9, at 5. R
175. See Michael Rogers, Answers at FDA Press Conference on the Pet Food Recall
(Apr. 19, 2007), at 5– 6 (discussing the FDA’s intention to inspect factories in China and
the attendant difficulties).
176. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., STAFF TRIP
REPORT: FOOD FROM CHINA: CAN WE IMPORT SAFELY? 7 n.10  (2007), available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_110/110-rpt.100407.ChinaTripReport.pdf.
177. Id.
178. Gong Jing, Sanjuqing’an Qianke: Chongwu Duliang Zhi Mei Shushi Chongwu
Siwang Shangqian Chongwu Huan Shenbing [A Criminal Record of Melamine: Poison-
ous Pet Food Kills Dozens of Pets and Thousands of Pets Gets Kidney Disease in the
United States], CAIJING, Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://finance.baidu.com/fengbao/
2008-09-12/111432189932.html.
179. Frank Greve & Grace Chung, Chinese Makers of Shoddy Goods Rarely Face U.S.
Sanctions, McClatchy Newspapers, June 30, 2009, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.
com/staff/frank_greve/v-print/story/70986.html.
180. See infra Part IV 4.4 of this article.
181. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, INSPECTION
REPORT NO. IPE-10915, US&FCS CHINA IS MEETING THE DEMANDS OF ITS CLIENT, BUT
INTERNAL OPERATIONS NEED ATTENTION 20 (Sept. 1999).
182. Greve & Chung, supra note 179. R
183. Id.
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of ways to take depositions in a foreign country.184  China, however, has
greatly restricted the ability of foreign parties to take depositions.185  Cur-
rently, China allows only foreign diplomatic personnel to conduct deposi-
tions in China under limited circumstances.186  Even though China and
the United States are both parties to the Hague Convention on Taking Evi-
dence Abroad,187 China has an official reservation to adopting Articles Six-
teen through Twenty-two of the Convention.188  As a result, “[t]aking
evidence in China for use in foreign courts is problematic.”189  Any viola-
tion may result in the arrest or detention of the U.S. citizen participating in
the deposition.190
Third, even if the plaintiff overcomes these procedural hurdles and
wins damages, he may find it difficult to enforce a U.S. judgment in China,
particularly because the defendant will likely lack attachable assets in the
United States.191  In order to enforce a foreign judgment in China, Article
265 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law192 requires the existence of a
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b):
In a Foreign Country.
(1) In General.
A deposition may be taken in a foreign country:
(A) under an applicable treaty or convention;
(B) under a letter of request, whether or not captioned a “letter
rogatory”;
(C) on notice, before a person authorized to administer oaths either by
federal law or by the law in the place of examination; or
(D) before a person commissioned by the court to administer any nec-
essary oath and take testimony.
(2) Issuing a Letter of Request or a Commission.
A letter of request, a commission, or both may be issued:
(A) on appropriate terms after an application and notice of it; and
(B) without a showing that taking the deposition in another manner is
impracticable or inconvenient.
(3) Form of a Request, Notice, or Commission.
When a letter of request or any other device is used according to a
treaty or convention, it must be captioned in the form prescribed by
that treaty or convention.  A letter of request may be addressed “To the
Appropriate Authority in [name of country].”  A deposition notice or a
commission must designate by name or descriptive title the person
before whom the deposition is to be taken.
185. See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, CHINA JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
(2010), http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_694.html [hereinafter CHINA
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE].
186. See id.
187. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Nov. 8, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241.
188. See CHINA JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 185. R
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Greve & Chung, supra note 179. R
192. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Min Shi Susong Fa (2007 Xouzheng) [The Law
of Civil Litigation Procedure of the People’s Republic of China (as amended in 2007)]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991) (P.R.C.) [here-
inafter Chinese Civil Procedure Law], translated at http://www.lawinfochina.com/.
Article 265: If a legally effective judgment or ruling made by a foreign court
seeks the recognition and enforcement of a people’s court of the People’s Repub-
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treaty of reciprocity.  Currently there is no bilateral or multilateral treaty
between the United States and China that obligates China to recognize and
enforce U.S. judgments.193
D. Challenges of Suing U.S. Retailers
Given the difficulties associated with suing Chinese manufacturers,
consumers might naturally assume they will be able to sue the U.S. retail-
ers of Chinese-made products.  Unfortunately, they will be disappointed to
find that a growing number of states have enacted statutes, with some com-
plicated exceptions, that shield such retailers from strict liability.194
lic of China, the party may directly apply to the intermediate people’s court of
the People’s Republic of China that has the jurisdiction over the case for the
recognition and enforcement, or the foreign court may, according to the provi-
sions of the international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s
Republic of China or based on the principle of reciprocity, request the recogni-
tion and enforcement of a people’s court.
Article 266: After a people’s court of the People’s Republic of China reviews an
application or pleading for the recognition and enforcement of a legally effective
judgment or ruling rendered by a foreign court according to the international
treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or based on
the principle of reciprocity, if the court considers that such a judgment or ruling
does not contradict the basic principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of
China nor violates the national, social, and public interest of China, the court
may render a ruling to recognize its force.  Where the enforcement is necessary,
the court may issue an order to enforce a foreign judgment according to the
relevant provisions of this Law.  If a legally effective judgment or ruling rendered
by a foreign court contradicts the basic principles of the law of the People’s
Republic of China or the national, social, and public interest of China, the peo-
ple’s court shall reject the application of recognition and enforcement.
193. Greve & Chung, supra note 179;; see also Donald C. Clarke, The Enforcement of R
United States Court Judgments in China: A Research Note 2 (George Washington Univ.
Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 236, May 27, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=943922.
194. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.003(a)(6) (Vernon 2009):
Liability of Nonmanufacturing Sellers:
(a) A seller that did not manufacture a product is not liable for harm caused
to the claimant by that product unless the claimant proves: [the manufac-
turer of the product is insolvent; not subject to jurisdiction of the court; or
the seller actually knew of the defect to the product at the time the seller
supplied the product, etc.].
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (2008):
Innocent Seller:
(1) No product liability action shall be commenced or maintained against
any seller of a product unless said seller is also the manufacturer of said
product or the manufacturer of the part thereof giving rise to the product
liability action. . . .
(2) If jurisdiction cannot be obtained over a particular manufacturer of a
product or a part of a product alleged to be defective, then that manufac-
turer’s principal distributor or seller over whom jurisdiction can be
obtained shall be deemed, for the purposes of this section, the manufac-
turer of the product.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-2-3 (LexisNexis 2004):
Actions against sellers limited:
A product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort may
not be commenced or maintained against a seller of a product that is
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There used to be a bright-line rule stating that retailers were strictly
liable for the defective products they sold.  This strict liability doctrine
originated in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.195  In Vandermark, the plaintiff,
who was injured in an automobile accident caused by defective brakes,
sued both the manufacturer and the automobile dealer.196  The court held
that both were strictly liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.197  Writing for the
court, Judge Traynor gave two primary reasons why retailers were subject
to strict liability.198  First, retailers are “an integral part of the overall pro-
ducing and marketing enterprise.”199  Therefore, they are in a position to
pressure the manufacturer and assure maximum protection for consum-
ers.200  Since the manufacturer and the retailer are involved in an on-going
course of business, they are able to calculate the costs of accidents and
allocate them accordingly.  Second, retailers are often the only party the
plaintiff can identify, and if the retailer is not held liable, the plaintiff could
be left without a remedy.201  “Strict liability on the manufacturer and
retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works
no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protec-
tion between them in the course of their continuing business relation-
ship.”202  Many state courts subsequently followed Vandermark.203  The
Restatement (Second) of Torts also embraced this idea in § 402A.204
With the publication of the Model Uniform Products Liability Act in
1979, some states began a trend of moving away from Vandermark.205
Opponents of Vandermark proffered pro-business arguments that retailers
are not in control of the production process and so are not in the position
alleged to contain or possess a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer unless the seller is a manufacturer of the product or
of the part of the product alleged to be defective.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(a) (2009):
No product liability action, except an action for breach of express warranty, shall be
commenced or maintained against any seller when the product was acquired and
sold by the seller in a sealed container or when the product was acquired and sold
by the seller under circumstances in which the seller was afforded no reasonable
opportunity to inspect the product in such a manner that would have or should
have, in the exercise of reasonable care, revealed the existence of the condition com-
plained of, unless the seller damaged or mishandled the product while in his pos-
session; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply if the
manufacturer of the product is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State or if such manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent.
195. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Ca. 1964); see OWEN, supra note
129, at 959. R
196. See Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 169.
197. Id. at 172.
198. See id. at 171– 72.
199. Id. at 171.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 171– 72.
202. Id. at 172.
203. See OWEN, supra note 129, at 959. R
204. See id.
205. See Frank J. Cavico Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Dis-
tributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 237– 41 (1987).
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to prevent the production of defective products.206  Retailers lack sufficient
information and thus are ill-equipped to defend themselves.207  In addi-
tion, because Vandermark gave courts greater ability to assert personal
jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers, it became inefficient for
retailers to waste resources on indemnity lawsuits against manufacturers
instead of simply requiring plaintiffs to sue the manufacturers directly in
the first place.208
Despite the fact that the Restatement (Third) of Torts reaffirmed Van-
dermark, a number of state statutes followed the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act, which significantly limits strict liability for retailers.209
These statutes typically create two major exceptions: retailers are strictly
liable (1) if the manufacturer of a defective product “is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court;” or (2) if the manufacturer is insolvent.210
Unfortunately, these two exceptions generally will not provide U.S.
consumers of Chinese imports with an adequate remedy.  First, although
the indirect and tenuous role a large number of small Chinese manufactur-
ers play in distribution will not meet the minimum contacts test,211 many
Chinese manufacturers set up U.S. branch offices to promote their prod-
ucts, which may be sufficient to subject them to state court jurisdiction.212
Thus, in many cases, a consumer will not be able to invoke the first excep-
tion to the retailer’s strict liability protection.  The second exception— man-
ufacturer insolvency—  is more complicated in the context of Chinese
imports.  The Chinese bankruptcy law is still in its infancy, thus Chinese
courts are reluctant to deal with bankruptcy cases.213  When a Chinese
manufacturer’s defective products cause injuries in the United States, the
Chinese government tends to respond by revoking the manufacturer’s
license and shutting it down rather than declaring it bankrupt.214  As a
result, the consumer will find it difficult to argue that the retailer should be
held strictly liable because the Chinese manufacturer is not insolvent but
merely shut down by the government.215  Therefore, a consumer’s only fea-
sible course of action, when injured by a Chinese-made product, will likely
be to sue the Chinese manufacturer in a U.S. court.  However, given that
Chinese manufacturers predominately do not maintain attachable assets in
the United States, a consumer who can otherwise successfully establish
jurisdiction and obtain a favorable judgment will not be able to collect
206. See Adam Feeney, In Search of a Remedy: Do State Laws Exempting Sellers from
Strict Liability Adequately Protect Consumers Harmed by Defective Chinese-Manufactured
Products?, 34 J. CORP. L. 567, 571 (2009).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See OWEN, supra note 129, at 960. R
210. Id.
211. See Hao Huang, Maximizing Chinese Imports’ Compliance with United States
Safety and Quality Standards:  Carrot and Stick from Whom?, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
131, 150– 51 (2008).
212. But cf. id.
213. See Feeney, supra note 206, at 581. R
214. Id.
215. See id.
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domestically.216  Consequently, the consumer will have to confront the
legal hurdle of enforcing a U.S. judgment in China.
Finally, it’s noteworthy that Georgia statutes “exempt non-manufactur-
ers unconditionally from strict products liability in tort.”217  Therefore,
Georgia consumers of Chinese-made products will have no way to sue U.S.
retailers, even if they were somehow able to meet the above noted excep-
tions.218  The statutory limitation on retailers’ strict liability is based on
the assumption that consumers can always bring a tort action against man-
ufacturers.219  This assumption is true in the context of U.S.-made prod-
ucts, but not imports.
In sum, although the FDA has wide discretion to refuse entry of defec-
tive imports, the agency is unable to conduct adequate inspections at every
port of entry to detect defective products.  Thus, the traditional outcome-
based enforcement tools provide ineffective deterrence to Chinese manu-
facturers.  Furthermore, with insurmountable legal hurdles, consumers are
discouraged from resorting to litigation against Chinese manufacturers in
U.S. courts.
IV. Outsourcing Regulatory Power to China
In response to the pet food scandal in 2007 and other high profile
recalls of Chinese-made products, the Bush Administration created an
Interagency Working Group (IWG) to tackle the issue of imported food
safety.220  The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also pro-
posed its own plans to improve food safety.221  Among other measures,
these action plans invariably call for “capacity building” of foreign food
safety regulatory regimes.222  Through bilateral agreements with China
and other nations, the objective of these proposals is to shift the burden of
securing food safety to those countries exporting food products into the
216. See Huang, supra note 211, at 151. R
217. OWEN, supra note 129, at 960. R
218. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (2000):
(b) For purposes of a product liability action based in whole or in part on the
doctrine of strict liability in tort, a product seller is not a manufacturer as pro-
vided in Code Section 51-1-11 and is not liable as such.
(c) Nothing contained in this Code section shall be construed to grant a cause
of action in strict liability in tort or any other legal theory or to affect the right of
any person to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution.
219. See Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposal for
Change, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1114 (2003).
220. See Exec. Order No. 13439, Establishing an Interagency Working Group on
Import Safety, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,053 (July 20, 2007), available at http://edocket.access.
gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-3593.pdf.
221. There are major reports on import safety to the President: (1) INTERAGENCY
WORKING GROUP ON IMP. SAFETY, IMPORT SAFETY - ACTION PLAN UPDATE: A PROGRESS SUM-
MARY (July 2008) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN UPDATE]; (2) ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY,
supra note 15; (3) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IMP. SAFETY, PROTECTING AMERICAN R
CONSUMERS EVERY STEP OF THE WAY: A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUAL IMPROVE-
MENT IN IMPORT SAFETY (Sept. 10, 2007) [hereinafter PROTECTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS].
All three reports are available at http://www.importsafety.gov/.
222. See ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY, supra note 15, at 24. R
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Unites States.223  In essence, the proposed measures seek to outsource
food safety regulatory power from the United States to China and other
foreign governments.  This section examines the United States’ action plans
and legislative proposals, as well as the U.S.-China agreement on import
safety.
A. U.S. Government’s Action Plans on Import Safety
There were several government action plans on import safety under
the Bush Administration.  These plans have thus far continued to be in
force under the Obama administration.  Experts predict that the Obama
Administration is unlikely to take a different approach from the previous
administration.224
1. Promoting Import Safety within Existing Resources
On July 18, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13439 estab-
lishing the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Import Safety, consisting
of members from 13 federal agencies.225  The stated mission of the IWG
was to “identify actions and appropriate steps that can be pursued, within
existing resources, to promote the safety of imported products . . . .”226
The President assigned the IWG three tasks.  First, the IWG had to
review current procedures used for ensuring imported product safety.  The
President emphasized that the IWG should review “existing cooperation
with foreign governments . . .” and verify inspections and certifications of
those manufacturers that export products into the United States.227  Sec-
ond, the IWG had to identify best importer practices, including processes
for making the right selection of foreign manufacturers, inspecting their
facilities, and ensuring the traceability of imported products.228  Third, the
IWG had to find ways to enhance cooperation on import safety among
federal agencies as well as state and local governments.229
2. The Ultimate Goal: Reduction of Physical Inspections
In September 2007, the IWG produced its first report, in which Mr.
Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of HHS, set the basic tone of the government’s
approach to import safety.230  He stated in the cover letter to the President
that the sharp increase of imports into the United States had made it
impossible for the federal government to physically inspect every imported
product.231  He emphasized that inspections at ports of entry would not
only hinder trade flow, but also “distract limited resources from those
223. See id.
224. Suppan, supra note 14, at 4– 5. R
225. See Exec. Order No. 13439, supra note 220, at 40,053. R
226. See id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 40,053– 54.
228. Id. at 40,054.
229. See id.
230. See PROTECTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS, supra note 221, cover letter. R
231. Id.
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imported goods that pose the greatest risk.”232  As a general principle, the
Secretary proclaimed that “we have to be smarter about what we do.”233
The Secretary characterized the physical inspections at ports of entry
as “snapshots” that were inadequate to ensure import safety.234  He pro-
posed moving towards a “prevention-focused ‘video’ model,” where imports
would be screened at critical points in the import life-cycle before entering
the U.S. market.235  In other words, foreign governments and private-sector
companies should shoulder the responsibility for safeguarding the produc-
tion process in foreign countries.
The “smarter” strategy that the Secretary called for encompasses three
steps: prevention, intervention, and response.236  As outlined, the Plan
emphasizes collaboration with foreign governments at the prevention
phase.237  The Plan has a rather ambitious goal: through capacity building,
the U.S. government helps developing nations by strengthening “their legal
systems and public health infrastructure . . . “ to ensure the safety of
imports coming into the U.S. market.238  It recommends making “product
safety an important principle of our diplomatic relationships with foreign
countries.”239  More specifically, it requires the federal government to
negotiate cooperative arrangements with foreign governments on product
safety240 to include measures for (1) conducting inspections in foreign
countries; (2) collaborating with foreign governments to conduct joint
investigations; and (3) expanding information sharing channels on prod-
uct safety.241
B. U.S.-China Agreement on Import Safety
The U.S.-China agreement on food safety is the direct result of the
IWG Action Plan.  The Agreement is also a culmination of multiple forces,
including high-level negotiations, finger pointing, China’s vigorous defense
of its product safety record and lobbying efforts by U.S. retailers to reduce
inspections at U.S. ports of entry.
1. The Blame Game
In the midst of the pet food scandal and toy recalls, U.S. Treasury Sec-
retary, Henry M. Paulson Jr., put aside his tenacious push for Chinese cur-
rency appreciation, which had been a hallmark of his tenure.242  He vowed
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id., at 11– 12.
237. See id.
238. See ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY, supra note 15, at 24. R
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 24– 26.
242. See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. to Pressure China on Food and Product Safety at Com-
ing Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at C7.
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to pressure China to reform its food safety system.243  He claimed that
“[r]ight now product and food safety is at the No. 1 issue.”244  Facing a
rapid decline in exports as a result of negative news reports on Chinese-
made products, the Chinese government quickly fought back.  It blamed
the United States for lax inspections of Chinese-made products and for
refusing to recognize Chinese government certifications on exports.245  In
retaliation, the Chinese government imposed restrictions on U.S. products
exported into China.246  China also accused the United States and world
media of deliberately vilifying “Made in China” products.  Vice Premier Wu
Yi reacted strongly to the unfavorable news reports: “ ‘We disagree with
biased, incomplete media reports and pure condemnation that are blind to
the facts; and we are opposed to trade barriers set for food safety issues
and politicizing the issues.’”247
In preparation for the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government pub-
lished a “White Paper” on food safety, in which it declared that “more than
99 percent of Chinese food to the United States met the U.S. safety and
quality standards.”248  Chinese President Hu Jintao once told President
Bush, “quality and safety questions are something that every country has
to deal with.”249  Apparently, President Hu was referring to safety con-
cerns over U.S.-made products entering China.
2. Scope of the Agreement
Under the foregoing backdrop, the United States and China signed an
agreement on food safety on December 14, 2007, entitled Agreement
Between the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States of
America and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection
and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China on the Safety of Food and
Feed (the Agreement).250  The Agreement is not merely, as some have per-
ceived it, a demand that China improve its food safety regulatory frame-
work.  Rather, it is a mutual agreement in which the United States and
China have agreed to assist each other in ensuring import safety.  A major
goal of the Agreement is to improve understanding and gain greater confi-
dence in each other’s regulatory system.251
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 176, at 5– 6. R
246. David Barboza, China Blocks Some Imports Of U.S. Chicken and Pork, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2007, at A10.
247. STEVE SUPPAN, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, U.S. CHINA AGREEMENT ON
FOOD SAFETY: TERMS AND ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY 3 (May 2008), available at http://www.
iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountID=451&refID=102837.
248. Id. at 3– 4.
249. Id. at 4.
250. The Agreement Between the Department of Health and Human Services of the
United States of America and the General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China on the Safety of Food and
Feed, U.S.-P.R.C., Dec. 11, 2007, 8325 KAV, available at http://www.globalhealth.gov/
news/agreements/ia121107b.html [hereinafter The Agreement].
251. Id. art. III(2).
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The Agreement covers four types of products in the initial phase: “(a)
Low-acid canned products or acidified food; (b) Pet food/pet treats of plant
origin or animal origin; (c) Ingredients of food and feed, i.e., wheat gluten
and rice protein; and (d) all aquaculture farming products other than mol-
luscan shellfish.”252  The Agreement allows for expansion to additional
products upon future negotiation.253  The Agreement’s scope seems lim-
ited, but the covered products account for a large portion of Chinese food
exports to the United States.  For example, China is the largest aquaculture
producer in the world, accounting for 70% of total production, and the
third largest exporter to the United States.254
3. Controversial Provisions
Most controversially, Article VI of the Agreement requires both China
and the United States to work towards mutual reliance on each other’s
registration and certification of covered products.255  Essentially, the Gen-
eral Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of
the People’s Republic of China (AQSIQ) will act as the FDA’s surrogate by
inspecting exports in China before they enter U.S. ports.256  If AQSIQ
determines that a shipment of Chinese exports meets U.S. requirements, it
will issue a certificate and electronically transmit the certificate to the
FDA.257  The FDA will consider AQSIQ’s registration and certification in
making decisions about whether to admit entry of the Chinese imports.258
In return, China will do the same.259  Even though the Agreement specifi-
cally states that neither party is obligated to solely rely on each other’s
registration and certification,260 the FDA is unlikely to resort to its tradi-
tional border inspection of Chinese imports having the Chinese registra-
tion and certification.  According to FDA officials, the goal of the
Agreement is to create a “system to ultimately reduce U.S. border inspec-
tions . . . .”261  The U.S. Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) has
lobbied hard for this goal because border inspections raise regulatory costs
252. Id. Annex § I(B)(1).
253. Id. Annex § I(B)(2).
254. BECKER, supra note 4, at 17 (noting that the United States relies heavily for its R
seafood on imports; “approximately 80% of U.S. seafood consumption is from imports
and that over 40% of these imports come from aquaculture operations.”).
255. The Agreement, supra note 250, art. VI(1): R
For the purpose of using AQSIQ/CNCA [China’s quality and certification
agency] registration and/or certification to inform decision-making regarding
the admissibility of Covered Products for entry into the United States, both Par-
ties shall endeavor to agree on all criteria and procedures that AQSIQ/CNCA
uses to implement the registration and certification provisions of this
Agreement.
256. See id. Annex § II(C)(1– 3).
257. See id.
258. Id. art. VI(1).
259. Id.
260. Id. art. VI(3).
261. Erica Lee Nelson, U.S.-China Food Safety Deal Could Give China Preferential
Treatment, 25 Inside Wash. Publishers, Dec. 14, 2007.
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and thereby decrease profits.262  Ultimately, the Agreement embodies the
GMA’s wishes.  In Annex § II(2), AQSIQ essentially assumes the task of
ensuring U.S. import safety:
Based on the success of the registration and certification programs . . . [U.S.]
HHS/FDA will use registration and certification information provided to it
by [China] AQSIQ to inform [U.S.] HHS/FDA import entry decisions, which
may include a reduction in the rate of examination of Designated Covered
Products that are part of the registration and/or certification program.263
4. Addressing U.S. Concerns
Some provisions of the Agreement do address the FDA’s concerns for
transparency.264  Section IV provides that the United States and China will
exchange their respective laws and regulations on food and feed safety.265
Each party is required to inform the other within two calendar days of
significant risks to public health posed by products and gross deceptions
against consumers by Covered Products.266  Apparently, the Agreement
reflects the FDA’s great frustration over the length of time it took to figure
out that melamine was the culprit causing the deaths of pets in the United
States.267  In China, however, it was well known that Chinese pet food, and
even human food, had boosted protein counts resulting from the adding of
melamine.268  In addition, the two parties must promptly provide detailed
contact information of covered establishments when so requested by the
other.269  The main purpose of this clause is to aid the United States in
locating Chinese producers.  In several instances the FDA has had great
difficulties in identifying perpetrators among 170,000 Chinese food
manufacturers.270
Additionally, the Agreement requires regulatory cooperation on food
safety between the United States and China.  Through training and scien-
tific cooperation, the two parties will develop strategies to prevent harmful
products from shipping to each other’s country.271  The two countries will
focus on identifying differences in food standards, such as maximum resi-
262. See GROCERY MFRS. ASS’N, A COMMITMENT TO CONSUMERS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF
IMPORTED FOODS: FOUR PILLARS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 3 (“Moreover, it would be
misguided to focus additional resources exclusively on activities at the border in a fruit-
less effort to ‘catch’ products that do not meet US standards.”).
263. The Agreement, supra note 250, Annex § II(2). R
264. See id.; id. art. III.
265. Id. art. IV.
266. Id.
267. See SUPPAN, supra note 247, at 3. R
268. See generally Chenglin Liu, Profit Above the Law: China’s Melamine Tainted
Milk Scandal, 79 MISS. L.J. 371 (2009) (examining melamine-tainted milk scandal in
China).
269. The Agreement, supra note 250, art. IV(3). R
270. Ying Feihu, Wanshan Woguo Shipin Zhiliang Xinxi Chuandao Jizhi Yindui
Shipin Anquan Wenti [Improvement of China’s Information Exchange on Food Safety],
5 Zhengzhi Yu Falu [ J. POL. & L.] 24, 26 (2007).
271. See The Agreement, supra note 250, art. V(1). R
\\server05\productn\C\CIN\43-2\CIN201.txt unknown Seq: 32  9-AUG-10 14:50
280 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 43
due levels (MRLs).272  Furthermore, the two parties will work on plans to
identify incidental or intentional additions of chemical, radiologic or
microbiological substances to foodstuffs.273  The Agreement also requires
cooperation on the preventing food adulteration for illegal gains.274
5. Benchmarks for Measuring Success
The U.S. government intends to evaluate the performance of the Agree-
ment based on two primary factors:275 (1) HHS/FDA’s rate of refusal of
covered products from China; and (2) the frequency of recalls of covered
Chinese products posing significant health hazards to U.S. consumers.
The first performance evaluation factor is inherently unreliable.  Since the
ultimate goal is to reduce inspections at ports of entry, the FDA will heav-
ily rely on AQSIQ’s electronically transmitted certifications in deciding
whether to admit imports.276  Without adequate physical inspections, FDA
refusal will most likely be due to insufficient paperwork rather than con-
cerns for quality and safety.277  The only concrete factor evaluating the
Agreement’s performance is the frequency of recalls of hazardous imports.
This criterion, however, is contrary to the FDA’s prevention-focused
approach.  This approach is also unfair to consumers because the govern-
ment will take action to reevaluate the Agreement only after injuries
prompt product recalls.
6. Winners and Losers
Overall, China is the unequivocal winner of the Agreement.  The Chi-
nese government gains control of the standards for exports to the United
States.  The GMA is another big winner.  Like other industries that have
shifted business overseas to cut costs, the GMA will greatly benefit from
outsourcing regulatory power to the Chinese government.  To some extent,
the FDA perceives itself as a winner because the Agreement allows the FDA
to stay “within existing resources” by reducing its “unbearable” burden of
securing imported food.278
Yet, by no means has the Agreement purely created a win-win situa-
tion.  The Agreement’s terms on mutual recognition of certification con-
ceded rights to China far superior to those in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),279 a surprise to both Canada and Mexico, the
closest trade allies with the United States.280  For years, Canada and Mex-
272. Id. art. V(2)(b).
273. Id. art. V(2)(d).
274. See id. art. V(2)(e).
275. See id. art. VIII(2)(b) (revealing the third factor— the overall percentage of cov-
ered products from non-AQSIQ registered establishments to the U.S.— a vague factor that
may need further clarification).
276. See id. art. VIII(2)(a); SUPPAN, supra note 247, at 8. R
277. See SUPPAN, supra note 247, at 5. R
278. See Exec. Order No. 13439, supra note 220, at 40,053. R
279. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
280. See Nelson, supra note 261. R
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ico have unsuccessfully urged the U.S. government to relax border inspec-
tions on their exports.281  The Agreement is likely to open the door for
trade conflicts between the United States and its two close neighbors.282
The Agreement could also lead other nations to seek the same preferential
treatment under the Most Favored Nations Clause of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).283
Most importantly, while U.S. consumers will benefit from the reduced
regulatory costs, and thus lower food costs, resulting from the Agreement,
they are potentially at greater risk of being exposed to adulterated and dele-
terious imports from China.  Going forward, U.S. consumers’ faith in
imported food rests with the Chinese government, far away in Beijing.
What remains unseen is whether the Chinese government will live up to
the U.S. government’s expectations.
V. Food Safety in China
China’s Food Safety Law284 provides that export quality and safety are
subject to the same standards and controls as domestic food products.
Therefore, to answer the question whether China can secure exported food
safety, examining China’s domestic food safety challenges, relevant laws,
and enforcement mechanisms, is necessary.  The most recent Food Safety
Law became effective on June 1, 2009.285  The next section will analyze the
new law and its implications for the safety of China’s food exports.
A. Development of Food Safety Law
Compared with the FD&C Act, China’s food safety law has a much
shorter history.286  The development of Chinese food safety law can be
traced back to the 1950s during the Korean War, otherwise known in
China as the War Resisting America and Aiding Korea.287  During that
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) art. I(1), Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
. . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
284. See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Gou Shipin Anquan Fa (Shi Xing) [Food Safety
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective June 1, 2009), art. 89(3), (P.R.C) [hereinafter Food
Safety Law], available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200903/146327461.pdf.
The Food Safety Law is discussed extensively in Part 4.3.
285. Id. art. 104.
286. See Zhang Fang, Zhongguo Xiandai Shipin Anquan Jianguan Falu Zhidu de Fazhan
Yu Wanshan [The Development and Improvement of China’s Modern Legal Framework on
Food Safety], 5 Zhengzhi Yu Falu [J. POLITICS & L.] 18, 18 (2007).
287. See Fenghuang Luntan, Wuer Nian Quanguo Dajia Qiangbi Liang Jianshang
Zhenshe Ji Shi Nian [The Execution of Two Swindlers in 1952 had Deterrence for
Decades], available at http://bbs.ifeng.com/viewthread.php?tid=3822247&extra=page
3D2.
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time, a number of soldiers died of botulism after eating contaminated
canned meat.288  Mao ordered the immediate execution of Mr. Wang and
Mr. Tian, the owners of the food factories that sold the tainted food to the
troops.289  Even though there were no officially promulgated regulations
on food safety, the executions sent a powerful message to other private
food manufacturers.290  With the development of socialization, the state
gradually took over privately owned food factories and transformed them
into state-owned-enterprises (SOE).291  The SOEs were notorious for their
low productivity, but food safety was under the government’s tight control.
As a result, except for sanitation problems, food adulteration was not a
major issue until the economic reforms in the 1980s.
In 1965, the State Council issued the first food regulation.292  The
regulation mainly dealt with the unsanitary conditions in which food prod-
ucts were stored, manufactured and transported.293  It did not set forth
requirements for food content because China was still recovering from a
catastrophic famine, in which an estimated thirty million people died of
malnutrition between 1960 and 1962.294  The government’s primary con-
cern was how to maintain an adequate food supply.295  In the promulga-
tion circular, the State Council stressed that the government should be
flexible in enforcing the regulation.296  If food manufacturers were unable
to comply with the regulation because of high costs, the government
should help them overcome those economic difficulties.297
In 1983, China enacted a trial implementation of the Food Sanitation
Law, in an attempt to regulate the growing number of privately owned food
manufacturers and vendors emerging from the economic reforms.298
Unlike the 1965 regulation, the Food Sanitation Law had greater coverage.
It set forth standards for food content, additives, containers, manufacturing
conditions and equipment.299  The Food Sanitation Law required food ven-
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See CHRIS BRAMALL, CHINESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 119– 21 (2009).
292. Shipin Weisheng Guanli Shixing Tiaoli [Food Sanitation Regulation (For Trial
Implementation)] (promulgated by the State Council on Aug. 17, 1965), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/02/content_2538913.htm [hereinafter Food
Sanitation Regulation].
293. See Bian Yongmin, The Challenges for Food Safety in China, 53 CHINA PERSP., para.
2 (2004), available at http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/document819.html.
294. See BRAMALL, supra note 291, at 126.
295. See id. at 134– 35.
296. See Food Sanitation Regulation, supra note 292. R
297. See Guowu Yuan Pizhuan Shipin Weisheng Guanli Tiaoli [The State Council
Notice on Promulgation of the Food Sanitary Regulation] (Aug. 17, 1965), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/02/content_2538913.htm.
298. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Gou Shipin Weisheng Fa (Shi Xing) [Food Sanitation
Law of The People’s Republic of China (trial version)] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 19, 1982, effective July 1, 1983, repealed 1995)
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.hflib.gov.cn/law/law/falvfagui2/XZF/FLFG/YYWS/
1180.htm.
299. See id. art. 3.
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dors to register with local industrial and commercial administrations.300
The law also prescribed penalties for violations of the Food Sanitation Law,
ranging from fines to criminal prosecution.301
The People’s Congress completely revamped the Food Sanitation Law
(FSL) in 1995.302  The updated FSL designated the Ministry of Health as
the primary enforcement agency.303  To provide detailed guidance for the
food industry, the State Council and provincial governments issued over
500 regulations and rules interpreting the FSL.304  Despite the improve-
ment of the legal framework, the FSL’s enforcement was rather weak.  Scan-
dals involving food adulteration repeatedly claimed lives.305  As a result,
the public lost confidence in the government’s ability to ensure food
safety.306
B. The Food Safety Law of 2009
1. Government Structure and Legislative Background
On February 28, 2009, the National People’s Congress passed the lat-
est version of the FSL, which took effect on June 1, 2009.307  Undoubtedly,
the 2008 milk scandal hastened its passage.308  To fully appreciate the new
FSL and its enforcement mechanisms, understanding China’s government
structure and legislative process is essential.
Unlike the U.S. federal structure, China has a centralized system,
which consists of the central government in Beijing and local governments
across the country.309  According to the Constitution, local governments
are subordinate to the central government.310  At the central level, the
National People’s Congress (NPC) is the legislature, which is at the peak of
the state structure.311  Below the NPC is the State Council, which is the
central administration of China.312  In the State Council, the Premier is the
head of the cabinet, which consists of Ministries, Commissions, and
300. See id. art. 26.
301. See id. arts. 37– 41.
302. See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Gou Shipin Weisheng Fa (Shi Xing) [Food Sanita-
tion Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 30, 1995, effective Oct. 30, 1995) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.
chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php?file_id=23857.
303. See id. art. 3.
304. See Zhang, supra note 286, at 19. R
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See Food Safety Law, supra note 284, art. 104. R
308. See James T. Areddy, Dairy Probe Began Almost 11 Months Before Being Dis-
closed, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, A7 (discussing the scandal).
309. See XIANFA [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] arts. 95, 138 (1982)
(P.R.C.) translated at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
310. See id. art. 100.
311. See id. arts. 2, 57– 58.
312. See id. arts. 85, 92.  Along with the State Council, three other institutions are
under the NPC:  the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Supreme People’s Court,
and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.  See id. art. 62, §§ 6– 8.  The President is the
head of the state.  See id. arts. 79– 80.  The President nominates the State Council’s
Premier as well as all other Ministers.  See id. art. 62, § 5.  The State Council is China’s
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Administrations.313  The State Council and other institutions are subject to
the NPC’s supervision.314  The NPC approves all legislative proposals the
State Council submits.315  The State Council proposed the new FSL in
2004, after a series of well-publicized food poisoning incidents.316  Experts
often claim that it took the NPC five years to pass the new FSL.317  In fact,
the delay resulted from the State Council’s reluctance to subject the food
industry to strict food safety laws until further food and drug scandals
occurred.318
At the local level, there exists a hierarchy of four levels of government
(in descending order): provinces, counties, cities and townships.319  Each
level reports to the next higher level.320  Provinces report directly to the
State Council.321  Even though Provinces are of the same bureaucratic level
Central Government.  See id. art. 85.  Therefore, the State President and the Premier of
the State Council are the most influential figures in China’s politics.
313. See id. art. 86.  Ministries and Commissions are of equal bureaucratic rank as
full ministerial level.  See id. arts. 80, 86, 90.  Administrations are of lower rank than
that of Ministries.  Three Administrations are related to the FSL’s enforcement: the Gen-
eral Administration of Safety, Quality Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and the State
Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) and the Industrial and Commercial Administra-
tion (SICA).  In China’s rigid bureaucratic structure, the administrative ranks are crucial
in enforcing particular policies and laws.  An agency of lower rank will find that pushing
through any agenda requiring a higher agency’s involvement is an extremely difficult
task.  As a result, the AQSIQ, SFDA and SICA will face hurdles in coordinating with the
MOH, MOA and other ministries on food safety issues.  In this regard, the 2007 U.S.-
China Agreement on Food Safety is a mismatch.  The Agreement was signed by the HHS
(cabinet level in the U.S.) and the AQSIQ (not a full ministerial, or cabinet level in
China). See The Agreement, supra note 250, pmbl.  The Agreement should have been R
between either the HHS and MOH or between the US FDA and AQSIQ.
314. See XIANFA [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] arts. 67, 73, 92
(1982) (P.R.C.) translated at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.
html.
315. See id. art. 89, § 2.
316. See Zhang, supra note 286, at 19. R
317. See id.
318. See infra Part V.D. of this article.
319. See XIANFA [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] arts. 95– 111 (1982)
(P.R.C.) translated at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
(establishing structure and function of local governments).  For a further understanding
of the relationship between central and local governments, see CHENGLIN LIU, Chinese
Law on SARS 43 (2004):
There are twenty-three Provinces, five Autonomous regions and four large cities,
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing and Chongqing, directly under the Central Govern-
ment.  Provinces and their equivalents are divided into prefectures or cities with
districts.  Under the prefecture or city level are counties, which are divided into
townships.
The relationship of the Central Government to local governments at various
levels is laid out in Article 3 of the Constitution, “The state institutions of the
People’s Republic of the China apply the principle of democratic centralism.”
The principle of democratic centralism was first developed by the CCP and has
become the basic principle governing all aspects of Chinese political life.  The
fundamental tenet of democratic centralism is that the local governments are
subordinate to the Central Government.
320. See XIANFA, supra note 319, arts. 95– 111. R
321. See id.
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as Ministries in Beijing, they are deemed local governments according to
the Constitution.322  Each of the four levels of local government mimics the
structure of the State Council; i.e., each local government directs various
departments.323
2. Central and Local Enforcement Agencies
At the central level, the new FSL requires that the State Council estab-
lish a Food Safety Commission (FSC) to administer its provisions.324  As a
Commission, the FSC will acquire a ministerial rank.  Since the law just
became effective, the State Council has not yet defined the scope of the FSC
and its jurisdiction.  At this point, the prospective relationship between the
FSC and other Ministries remains unclear.
The new FSL designates the Ministry of Health (MOH) as the primary
agency in charge of setting food safety standards, evaluating food safety
risks, issuing public notices on food safety, and investigating major food
safety incidents.325  In addition, it grants the MOH the authority to set
standards for food certification agencies.326  It further makes the AQSIQ,
the State Industrial and Commercial Administration (SICA), and the State
Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) responsible for the supervision of
food manufacturing, distribution, and catering services.327
At the local level, the new FSL places governments at the county level
and above in charge of food safety administration in their respective juris-
dictions.328  Within each level of local government, the FSL mandates
departments of health, agriculture, quality control, industrial and commer-
cial, and food and drug to coordinate with each other to enforce its
provisions.329
Thus, local governments are on the frontline of food inspections.  Not-
withstanding the Central Government’s power to conduct inspection tours,
it is practically impossible for officials from Beijing to make regular visits
to the nearly two million food manufacturers scattered around the country.
Therefore, whether the new FSL succeeds in securing food safety ulti-
mately depends on the effectiveness of local government enforcement.
In addition to government agencies, the new FSL encourages trade
associations, consumer protection organizations, research institutions, and
individuals to contribute to the enforcement of its requirements.  Article 10
specifically grants private organizations and individuals the right to report
to the government any safety violation occurring in the food production
process.330
322. See id. art. 95.
323. See id. at 95– 111.
324. See Food Safety Law, supra note 284, art. 4. R
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. art. 5.
329. Id. art. 6.
330. See id. art. 10.
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3. Food Safety Standards
In China’s transition from a predominately agrarian society to an
industrial society, the food industry remains extremely fragmented with
170,000 food processing firms, over 70% having fewer than ten work-
ers.331  Prior to the FSL, the government promulgated some food quality
standards that were typically inconsistent, outdated, and underdevel-
oped.332  A lack of sufficient standards is a serious problem in food safety.
To remedy this issue, the FSL devotes an entire chapter to defining
mandatory food safety standards.333
Under the new FSL, the MOH is responsible for determining and
promulgating food safety standards except for pesticide residue levels,
which the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) sets.334  Article 21 requires that
the State Council and concerned Ministries establish safety standards for
meat and poultry.335
According to Article 20, the FSL food safety standards are to include:
a) Tolerance levels of pathogenic microorganisms, pesticide residues,
animal drug residues, heavy metals, pollutants and other health haz-
ardous materials;
b) Food additives and their scope and usage;
c) Nutritional content of infant food and foods intended for particular
groups of people, such as the sick and old;
d) Labeling related to food safety and nutrition;
e) Sanitary conditions for food processing;
f) Quality requirements related to food safety;
g) Food inspection methods and procedures; and
h) Other food safety standards.336
On January 20, 2010, the MOH established the State Food Safety Stan-
dard Assessment Committee, which is in charge of drafting a national stan-
dard on food safety.337  Violation of the food safety standards will result in
a fine of not more than 50,000 Yuan ($7,000), if the sale value is less than
10,000 Yuan ($1,400); or a fine of not more than ten times the sale value, if
the sale value is more than 10,000 Yuan.  Serious violations will result in
revocation of the food manufacturer’s license.338
To ensure food industry compliance with the new law, the MOH
intends to study the consistency between the new safety standards and the
existing quality and sanitary standards.339  Realistically, it will take a long
331. Ying, supra note 270, at 26. R
332. See id. at 25– 27.
333. See Food Safety Law, supra note 284, arts. 18– 25. R
334. See id. art. 21.
335. Id.
336. Id. art. 20.
337. Weisheng Bu Chengli Diyi Jie Shipin Anquan Guojia Biaozhun Shencha Weiyuan
Hui [The Ministry of Health established the first State Food Safety Standard Assessment
Committee], available at http://www.cfs.gov.cn/cmsweb/webportal/W402/A64031418.
html.
338. See Food Safety Law, supra note 284, art. 18. R
339. See id. art. 22.
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time for the Health Ministry to complete this study.
4. Enforcement Tools
Like the U.S. FD&C Act, the new FSL provides two kinds of enforce-
ment tools: outcome-based and production-based.
a) Outcome-based Approach
The new FSL requires that the county government departments of
quality control, industrial and commercial, and food and drug conduct reg-
ular or unannounced inspections of food manufacturers.340  The scope of
these inspections includes site visits, sampling, auditing of contracts, and
review of receipts and accounting books.341  Upon finding FSL violations,
the departments are authorized to seize illegal food products, materials,
additives, or equipment.342  The departments may also shut down food
manufacturers if they deem it necessary.  The new FSL also requires that
the departments keep inspection records and increase inspections of repeat
violators.343  If an FSL violation constitutes a crime, the departments must
transfer the food manufacturer’s case to the public security department for
a criminal investigation.344
To ensure impartial inspections and certifications, the new FSL pro-
vides administrative penalties for inspectors who violate the law.  If an
inspector issues a false report, the inspector will face dismissal or forced
resignation, and disbarment from conducting food inspections for ten
years.  In addition, the government will revoke the inspection agency’s
practice license.345
The new FSL provides for product recall as another enforcement
tool.346  If a food manufacturer fails to comply with food safety standards,
the manufacturer must immediately stop production and voluntarily recall
illegal products already in circulation.  It must also contact consumers and
publicly announce the recall.  The manufacturer must further inform the
relevant departments of the local government.  In addition, the manufac-
turer must take appropriate measures to destroy recalled products in order
to prevent reentry into the market.  If the manufacturer refuses to conduct a
voluntary recall, the local government must compel it to retrieve its illegal
products.
b) Production-based Tools
The new FSL encourages food manufacturers to adopt GMP or HACCP
practices.347  It tasks the government accreditation agency to issue certifi-
cates to qualified manufacturers and conduct follow-up audits of these
accredited manufacturers.  If the agency finds that a certified manufacturer
340. See id. arts. 60, 77.
341. Id. art. 77.
342. See id.
343. Id. art. 79.
344. See id. art. 81.
345. Id. art. 93.
346. Id. art. 53.
347. Id. art. 33.
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fails to meet the requirements of GMP or HACCP, the agency must revoke
the certification and inform the relevant local department.348  The agency
must also publicly announce such revocations.
To increase traceability, the new FSL requires food manufacturers to
keep records regarding the supply of raw food materials, food additives,
and other food ingredients.349  Manufacturers must keep these records for
at least two years.350  Manufacturers have a duty to check the quality of
raw materials and verify supplier certifications.351  Additionally, manufac-
turers must keep records, for at least two years, of internal quality checks
conducted before their products entered the market.352  Failure to maintain
the required records will result in a fine of not more than 20,000 Yuan
($3,000) for minor violations.353  For serious violations, manufacturers
face injunction or revocation of their production license.354
C. Criminal Penalties
The new FSL does not directly set forth criminal penalties for serious
food safety violations. Instead, the FSL only refers to application of the
Criminal Law of China.355  The Criminal Law imposes severe criminal
sanctions on producers and sellers who produce counterfeits or substan-
dard products that cause serious bodily injury or death.356  For example,
Article 140 prohibits the production of adulterated products as well as the
sale of counterfeits as genuine products, substandard products as good
products, or unqualified products as qualified ones.357  For producers who
348. See id.
349. Id. art. 36.
350. Id.
351. Id. art. 39.
352. Id. art. 37.
353. Id. art. 87.
354. Id.
355. Id. art. 98.
356. Liu, supra note 268. R
357. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China  (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, amended Mar. 14,
1997) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/criminalLawENG.
php.  Article 140 states:
Any producer or seller who mixes impurities into or adulterates products, or
passes a fake product off as a genuine one, a defective product as a high quality
one, or a substandard product as a standard one, if the amount of earnings from
sales is more than 50,000 yuan but less than 200,000 yuan, shall be sentenced
to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than two years or criminal detention
and shall also, or shall only, be fined not less than half but not more than two
times the amount of earnings from sales; if the amount of earnings from sales is
more than 200,000 yuan but less than 500,000 yuan, he shall be sentenced to
fixed-term imprisonment of not less than two years but not more than seven
years and shall also be fined not less than half but not more than two times the
amount of earnings from sales; if the amount of earnings from sales is more
than 500,000 yuan but less than 2,000,000 yuan, he shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not less than seven years and shall also be fined not less
than half but not more than two times the amount of earnings from sales; if the
amount of earnings from sales is more than 2,000,000 yuan, he shall be sen-
tenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 15 years or life imprisonment, and shall
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violate this law and have sale amounts exceeding two million Yuan
($280,000), Article 140 mandates a sentence of a fifteen-year, fixed-term
imprisonment or life imprisonment.358  In addition, the provision imposes
a fine of 50% to 200% of the sale amount or a confiscation of the total
amount of the illegal proceeds.359
Similarly, Article 143 imposes criminal sanctions on producers and
sellers of foods that do not conform to hygienic standards.360  For substan-
dard products that cause food poisoning accidents or other severe food-
borne diseases, the responsible parties face mandatory sentences ranging
from several years of fixed-term imprisonment to life imprisonment,
depending on the severity of the circumstances.361  Violators may addi-
tionally face a fine of up to twice the total sale amount of the substandard
products.362
Further, Article 144 proscribes the most severe criminal punishment
for producing adulterated foods.363  This article applies to those who pro-
duce or sell foods mixed with poisonous or harmful non-food materials.
Under this article, committing the act itself results in a sentence of not
more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment.  If the act gives rise to
serious harm to human health, the sentence must be not less than five
years and not more than ten years.  If the adulterated products cause seri-
ous bodily harm or death, however, the sentence may be the death
also be fined not less than half but not more than two times the amount of
earnings from sales or be sentenced to confiscation of property.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. art. 143:
Whoever produces or sells food that is not up to hygiene standards, thus caus-
ing an accident of serious food poisoning or resulting in any serious disease
caused by food-borne bacteria, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of
not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be
fined not less than half but not more than two times the amount of earnings
from sales; if serious harm is done to human health, he shall be sentenced to
fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven
years and shall also be fined not less than half but not more than two times the
amount of earnings from sales; if the consequences are especially serious, he
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than seven years or
life imprisonment, and shall also be fined not less than half but not more than
two times the amount of earnings from sales or be sentenced to confiscation of
property.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. art. 144.
Whoever mixes the foods that he produces or sells with toxic or harmful non-
food raw materials or knowingly sells such foods shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention and shall
also, or shall only, be fined not less than half but not more than two times the
amount of earnings from sales; if an accident of serious food poisoning or any
serious disease caused by food-borne bacteria has resulted, thus seriously harm-
ing human health, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less
than five years but not more than 10 years and shall also be fined not less than
half but not more than two times the amount of earnings from sales; if death is
caused to another person or especially serious harm is done to human health,
he shall be punished according to the provisions in Article 141 of this Law.
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penalty.364
D. Enforcement Obstacles
On its face, the new FSL bears a close resemblance to the U.S. FD&C
Act.  Both laws set forth high standards for food content and manufactur-
ing processes; both laws rely on outcome-based and production-based
enforcement tools.  But while the new FSL offers potential solutions to
China’s entrenched food safety problems, the FSL will nonetheless face
serious challenges in implementation.  This section examines four major
obstacles the Chinese government will face in enforcing the new FSL.
1. Local Protectionism and the Melamine Tainted Milk Scandal
Since the new FSL primarily depends on local governments for its
enforcement, soon after its passage many Chinese experts expressed doubt
about its effectiveness.365  These concerns are well grounded because the
new FSL does not include any mechanism to combat widespread local pro-
tectionism, which has been blamed for several major food safety scandals
in China.366
Ironically, local protectionism originated from the economic reforms
in the 1980s that set China on the path toward rapid economic growth.367
The essence of the reform was to transition from a planned economy to a
market economy though, among other strategies, decentralization.368  Dur-
ing the decentralization process, local governments assumed the primary
role of developing local economies.369  Government officials at each level
are actually appointed by government officials at the next higher level,
364. See id. arts. 141, 144.  Article 141 states:
Whoever produces or sells fake medicines that are harmful enough to seriously
endanger human health . . . [or] if death is caused to another person or espe-
cially serious harm is done to human health, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term
imprisonment of not less than 10 years, life imprisonment or death, and shall
also be fined not less than half but not more than two times the amount of
earnings from sales or be sentenced to confiscation of property.
365. Zhang Ling, Shipin Anquan Reng Duotou Guanli Weiyuan Huyu Chedi Gaige
[Food Safety Enforcement Still Relies on Multiple Local Agencies and Experts Have Thus
Expressed Doubt About the Effectiveness of the New Food Safety Law], Chengdu
Shangbao, Mar. 1, 2009, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-03-01/0323152
36384s.shtml.
366. Liu, supra note 268. R
367. See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 395 (2000).
368. See id. at 386– 87, 395.
369. Contrary to the western model, which promotes market economy by means of
democracy, China seems to have succeeded in achieving economic growth without mov-
ing towards democracy.  Therefore, the revered statesman Mr. Deng Xiaoping referred to
the Chinese model as “Socialism with the Chinese Characteristics.”  Deng Xiaoping, For-
mer Chairman, Central Military Commission of CCP, Speech to the Second Session of
the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-Governmental Persons: Build Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics (June 30, 1984), available at http://www.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/
China/Deng/Building.htm.
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rather than elected by the local people.370  As a result, local officials
became accountable only to the government officials directly above
them.371
Seeking economic miracles, the central government has emphasized
higher gross domestic production (GDP) disproportionally to food
safety.372  Compared with economic growth, food safety has rarely been a
top priority except during outbreaks of major food scandals.  As a result,
the primary criterion for assessing the performance of local officials is
their ability to increase local GDP.373  Local officials, seeking reappoint-
ments and promotions, have made every effort to maintain high economic
growth, even at the expense of safety and quality.
In the process, local officials have forged close ties and developed
mutually beneficial relationship with local industries.  Local governments
expect and rely upon local enterprises to grow the local economy.  In
exchange, the local government gives local industries special favors includ-
ing minimum safety and quality inspections.374  Corruption often taints
the ties between enterprises and government officials.  In the Shanxi Prov-
ince, for example, a number of local leaders in charge of mine safety actu-
ally held significant financial stakes in local mines with notorious safety
records.375
The 2008 melamine tainted milk scandal illustrates the special rela-
tionship between local governments and local milk industries.376  In Sep-
tember 2008, a news report first linked the death of an infant to baby
formula tainted with melamine.  The Sanlu Company (Sanlu) based in
Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province produced the tainted formula.377
According to official estimates, at least six babies died and nearly 300,000
were sickened from drinking the tainted milk.378  More than 300 children
370. This practice seems contrary to the notion envisioned in the Constitution that
the local people’s congress elects local government officials.  See XIANFA [Constitution of
the People’s Republic of China] art. 101 (1982) (P.R.C.) translated at http://english.
people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.  In reality, however, the local people’s
congress consistently rubber stamps nominations by the Chinese Communist Party.
Thus, the central government succeeded in designating pre-ordained officials to charge
local economies.  In many cases, the central government has “parachuted” officials into
particular provinces without open consultation with the local congresses.  Bo Zhiyue,
China’s New Provincial Leaders: Major Reshuffling Before the 17th National Party Con-
gress, 5 CHINA: AN INT’L J. 1, 12– 13 (2007).
371. In recent years, the central government has frequently shifted governors from
one province to another without elections. See, e.g., id. at 17.
372. See Huang, supra note 211, at 141. R
373. See id.
374. See id.
375. Zhong Ge, Meikuang Guangu Chezi “Anliu” Xiongyong Yixie Guanyuan
Mingche Anchi [Some Officials Still Secretly Hold Shares in Coal Mines], Xinhua News,
Oct. 28, 2005, available at http://gov.people.com.cn/GB/46728/54337/54340/38087
08.html.
376. Liu, supra note 268. R
377. See Loretta Chao, Victims of Tainted Milk File Lawsuit in China’s High Court,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2009, at A10.
378. Woguo Gong 29 Wan Yinger Miniao Xitong Yin Shi Wenti Naifen Chuxian
Yichang [Over 290,000 Infants Suffered Urinary Abnormalities from Drinking the
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were hospitalized for treatment.379
The melamine contamination was by no means an accident.  The milk
suppliers deliberately added melamine to diluted milk in order to deceive
quality control reviewers.380  In later production, milk processors only
checked protein levels by measuring nitrogen concentration.  As a nitrogen-
rich crystalline compound, the added melamine increased the nitrogen
content and made the adulterated milk appear rich in protein.381  To make
matters worse, some reports alleged that milk processors also added mela-
mine to already contaminated milk in order to cut costs and increase
revenue.382
A month before the scandal broke out, Sanlu actually made urgent
reports to the local government about the unusually high level of melamine
in its products and the numerous complaints from consumers.383  Accord-
ing to the law, the local government had a legal obligation to promptly
report the incident to the State Council in Beijing.384  The local govern-
ment, however, took every measure to conceal relevant information for fear
of damaging the local economy.385
While the internal communications between Sanlu and the local gov-
ernment remain a mystery, a post-scandal public apology was quite
revealing.  In the apology, the local government explained the reasons for
its failure to immediately report the problem to the central government.386
The local government blamed itself for a lack of political sensitivity and
attributed the cover-up to its failure to fully appreciate the serious political
and economic consequences of the scandal.387  The apology also stated
that it believed that Sanlu could eventually restore its shattered image and
regain public trust if it could quickly improve quality.388  The local govern-
Tainted Milk], XINHUA NET, Dec. 1, 2008; see also Will Clem & Lilian Zhang, Tainted
Milk Feared to have Killed Another, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 9, 2009, at 5.
379. Chao, supra note 377. R
380. See World Health Organization, Questions and Answers on Melamine, http://
www.who.int/csr/media/faq/QAmelamine/en/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
381. See id.
382. See David Barboza, China’s Dairy Farmers Say They Are Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2008, at A5; see also Julie R. Ingelfinger, Melamine and the Global Implications of Food
Contamination, NEW ENG. J. MED., Dec. 25, 2008, at 2746 (“Before the current melamine
disaster, the marked dilution of infant formula in China had resulted in marasmus in
some infants, which led to government directives to increase the protein content of such
preparations or risk severe penalties.  Thus, it is possible that the adulteration was con-
ceived in response to a well-intentioned government directive.”).
383. Ye Tieqiao, Gongsu Jiguan Pilu Sanlu Yinman Shishi Zhi Tunai Wailiu [Sanlu’s
Cover-Up Caused Poisonous Milk to Enter the Market], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA
YOUTH DAILY], Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-01/050616
959786.shtml.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Dong Zhiyong, Shijiazhuang Zhengfu: Sanlu Naifen Shijian Women You Buke
Tuixie de Zeren [Shijiazhuang Municipality: We Are Responsible for the Milk Scandal], Jingji
Ribao [ECON. DAILY], Oct. 4, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/
2008-09/30/content_10136125.htm.
387. Id.
388. Id.
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ment admitted that it was concerned a revelation would damage Sanlu’s
reputation and result in job losses.  The local government regretted that,
because of its delay, the central government had missed the opportunity to
control the negative impact of the scandal.389
The apology instantly drew immense public criticism.  As pointed out
by Zhang Qianfan, a prominent constitutional law expert at Beijing Univer-
sity, Sanlu was not only an important source of local revenue but also of
local political legacy.390  The apology revealed that the local government’s
first reaction was how to help Sanlu avoid bad publicity and eliminate the
negative impact of a scandal.  Another commentator, Mr. Shao, discerned
that the apology was not actually directed to the victims but to the central
government itself.391  The real purpose of the apology was to beg for for-
giveness from those high officials with the authority to determine the polit-
ical futures of local leaders.
Depending upon governments to enforce high safety standards is illog-
ical when those governments are willing to conceal scandals for local
industries.  U.S. scholars have long held concerns about the overall
enforcement of laws in China due to local protectionism.  Professor
Lubman pointed out that “local protectionism is so strong that ‘it is practi-
cally impossible for the leadership in Beijing to maintain sustained and
systematic monitoring across China, with the possible exception of a hand-
ful of key issues, because enforcement costs are prohibitive.’”392  Profes-
sors Liebman and Milhaupt echoed this observation stating that “[l]ocal
protectionism is perhaps the single biggest problem undermining China’s
efforts to strengthen its legal system, and the combination of devolved
authority and local protectionism frequently leads to under
enforcement.”393
389. Id.
390. Zhang Qianfan, Yi Sanlu Naifen Shijian Weili: Shipin Anquan Libukai Meiti
Jiandu [Sanlu as an Example: Media Reporting is Indispensable for Ensuring Food
Safety], Nanfan Ribao, Oct. 7, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/
2008-10/07/content_10159399.htm.
391. Shao Jian, Shijiazhuan Shi Zhengfu Jiujing Gai Xiang Shui Daoqian? [Whom Did
Shijiazhuang Government Owe an Apology?], Zhujiang Wanbao, Oct. 3, 2008, available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2008-10-03/090016392010.shtml.
392. Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 77 (2006).
393. Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s
Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 982 (2008); see also Eric Priest, The Future of
Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 795, 822 (2006) (“Local protec-
tionism probably constitutes the largest obstacle to cracking down on piracy in China.”);
Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and
Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
267, 335 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he lack of strong centralized environmental adminis-
tration and a deep-seated political unwillingness to disrupt economic growth, combined
with corruption and local protectionism, has precluded China from fully complying
with its international treaty obligations and enforcing its domestic environmental
laws.”).
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2. Rampant Corruption and Mr. Zheng’s Execution
China has the most serious corruption problems among industrialized
nations, despite government efforts to punish corrupt officials.  Trans-
parency International’s 2008 survey indicated that China is very similar to
other countries plagued with corruption scandals, such as Ghana,
Romania, Mexico, and Peru.394  Overall, China ranks 72 among 180 coun-
tries surveyed for general corruption perceptions,395 despite its status as
one of the most robust economies in the world.
In recent years, some corrupt officials and executives found safe
havens in Canada and the United States because the two countries do not
have extradition treaties with China.396  The Ministry of Public Security
estimated that in 2004 around 500 corrupt Chinese officials had fled over-
seas with approximately $8 billion worth of state assets.397  An infamous
example is Mr. Lai Changxing, who circumvented Chinese customs and
allegedly “smuggled goods worth as much as $10 billion, under the protec-
tion of corrupt government officials.”398  Mr. Lai is now seeking asylum
status in Canada on the ground that he would be executed if repatri-
ated.399 The relation between corrupt officials and China’s food and drug
industry is best illustrated by the case of Mr. Zheng Xiaoyu.400  Mr. Zheng
was the director of the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA).401  In
2007, the People’s Court convicted Mr. Zheng on charges of bribery and
394. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2008 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, http://
www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table.
395. Id.
396. See Mathew Bloom, A Comparative Analysis of the United States’ Response To
Extradition Requests from China, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 180– 81 (2008).
397. Chenglin Liu, Informal Rules, Transaction Costs, and the Failure of the “Takings”
Law in China, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005).
398. The Associated Press, No. 1 Fugitive of China Fears Death if Repatriated, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/world/americas/11iht-
canada.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
399. See id.
400. There are several law review articles citing Mr. Zheng’s execution, but none of
them provide a detailed analysis of why the death penalty does not deter corruption
among Chinese officials.  See Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti-Corruption Efforts
Paying Off? International and National Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region and Their
Impact on India and Multinational Corporations, 31 HAWAII L. REV. 59, 59 (2008); Greg-
ory H. Fuller, Comment, Economic Warlords: How De Facto Federalism Inhibits China’s
Compliance with International Trade Law and Jeopardizes Global Environmental Initiatives,
75 TENN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2008); Paulman, supra note 10, at 124; Julia A. Phillips,
Comment, Does “Made in China” Translate to “Watch Out” for Consumers?: The U.S. Con-
gressional Response to Consumer Product Safety Concerns, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
217, 225 (2008); Laura C. Nastase, Note, Made in China: How Chinese Counterfeits Are
Creating a National Security Nightmare for the United States, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 162 (2008); Russell Stetler, Killing Fewer, and Killing Carefully:
Death Penalty Defense In China on the Eve of the Beijing Olympics, 32 CHAMPION , July
2008, at 22.
401. Zheng Xiaoyu de Dianxing Fubai: Yige Bumen Sunhai Yige Hangye [Mr. Zheng
Xiaoyu: A typical Case of Corruption that Ruined the Whole Food and Drug Industry],
Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan, Mar. 9, 2007, available at http://cn.chinareviewnews.com/
doc/1003/2/4/0/100324072_5.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100324072 [herein-
after A Typical Case of Corruption].
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dereliction of duty; the combined sentences resulted in an order for his
immediate execution.402
Even though the death sentence stemmed from Mr. Zheng’s bribery
conviction, his prosecution on dereliction charges revealed the entrenched
administrative failures of China’s food and drug safety system.403
Due to lack of oversight, the SFDA had no standard procedures for
reviewing and approving new drug applications.  Furthermore, the SFDA
lacked a plan to handle the relentless number of new drug applications
submitted by over 6,000 pharmaceutical companies across the nation.404
Even after streamlining the verification process,405 the flood of applica-
tions continued to overwhelm the SFDA.  At its peak, one SFDA officer had
to review over 30 applications per day.406  During Mr. Zheng’s eight-year
tenure, the SFDA approved 150,000 new drugs.407  In 2004 alone, the
402. See Former Drug Head Sentenced to Death, CHINA DAILY, May 29, 2007, availa-
ble at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-05/29/content_882475htm.
403. See David Barboza, A Chinese Reformer Betrays His Cause, and Pays, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2007, at A1.  Mr. Zheng was a longtime drug maker who moved steadily up the
bureaucratic ladder.  When China decided to establish the SFDA in 1998, Mr. Zheng
became its first director. See id.  Mr. Zheng’s appointment was the direct result of his
two seminal proposals: (1) to consolidate drug registration and approval power under
the SFDA; and (2) to mandate all drug makers across the country to adopt GMPs in line
with internationally acknowledged standards for drug industries. See id.  The two pro-
posals offered promising solutions to the serious food and drug safety problems that
China had experienced in the 1990s.
Prior to the establishment of the SFDA, only provincial governments had the power to
approve new drugs.  Thus, at that time, there existed no national standard for pharma-
ceutical products.  Since the local governments had strong ties with pharmaceutical
companies, drug approval processes were distorted by corruption.  Fake and substan-
dard drugs injured and killed a great number of patients each year. See id.  In addition,
some provincial governments used red tape to block drugs from being introduced in
other provinces.  To establish national standards for pharmaceutical products and cur-
tail local protectionism, Mr. Zheng issued a departmental rule that revoked the provin-
cial governments’ power to approve new drugs.  According to this rule, the SFDA became
the sole authority for registration and approval of pharmaceutical products. See Ames
Gross & Momoko Hirose, Product Registration & Other Regulatory Issues in China, SPE-
CIALTY PHARMA (2007), available at http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/
china/2007_product_registration_and_other.
The intent of the consolidation was to sever the ties between pharmaceutical makers
and the local governments and consequently reduce corruption. See Hepeng Jia, China
Syndrome— A Regulatory Framework, 25 NATURE BIOTECH, 835, 835– 36. Apparently,
pharmaceutical companies quickly adapted to the new changes and replaced their prior
relationships with the provincial governments for one with the SFDA. See id.
404. See A Typical Case of Corruption, supra note 401. R
405. See id. To reduce application backlogs, Mr. Zheng abandoned the original plan
that required the SFDA to verify each application package. See id. Instead, Mr. Zheng
authorized provincial food and drug departments to verify the application materials in
their respective jurisdictions. See id. As a result, the SFDA missed the opportunity to
identify phony applications and thus seriously compromised the very goal that the con-
solidation was designed to achieve. See id.
406. Dali L. Young, Regulatory Learning and Its Discontents in China: Promise and
Tragedy at the State Food and Drug Administration, at 10, available at http://www.
daliyang.com/files/0_1_Yang_SFDA_regulatory_learning_and_its_discontents.pdf, forth-
coming in PUSHING BACK GLOBALIZATION  (John Gillespie and Randy Peerenboom eds.,
2009).
407. Barboza, supra note 403. R
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SFDA approved 10,009 new drugs, while the U.S. FDA only approved 148
new drugs during the same year.408  In other words, the SFDA approved a
new drug every 12 minutes.  At such a rapid pace, there was simply no way
to ensure the authenticity of the applications.409  It was no surprise when
at least six fake drugs were subsequently identified among the SFDA
approved drugs that seriously injured and killed patients.410
Mr. Zheng’s tenure was also marked by his strenuous push for GMP
standards to ensure drug safety and quality.411  China’s drug industry
lagged behind those in developed countries.  Many drug makers still kept
antiquated equipment in operation.  In some Chinese herb medicine facto-
ries, workers used their bare feet to blend drug ingredients.412  As soon as
Mr. Zheng became the head of the SFDA, he made implementation of GMP
his top priority.  The SFDA required all pharmaceutical producers to meet
GMP standards by 2004.413  As mandated, failure to meet the standards
would result in losing a state production license.414
As with new drug approvals, the SFDA and drug industry were not
fully prepared to handle the chaos caused by Mr. Zheng’s changes.  For the
entire pharmaceutical industry, the adoption of GMP became a tremen-
dous undertaking.415  For small and mid-sized drug makers, GMP stan-
dards were all but an unrealistic goal.  Facing the tough choice between
losing accreditation and incurring additional costs to adopt GMP, pharma-
ceutical companies quickly attempted to avoid both possibilities by bribing
Mr. Zheng and his family.  Court documents show that Mr. Zheng took
more than $850,000 in bribes from pharmaceutical companies.416  To
solicit these bribes, Mr. Zheng directed his wife and son to form a consult-
ing firm that provided guidance to pharmaceutical companies.  For exam-
ple, Double Doves Company (DDC) retained the consulting firm and paid
his wife’s salary and company stock even though she did not work for the
company.417  DDC also generously provided the down payment for a
house in Shanghai for Zheng’s son.  In return, Mr. Zheng expedited the
approval of DDC’s application for production of sterilized syringes.418
408. See A Typical Case of Corruption, supra note 401. R
409. See Zheng Xiaoyu: Yao Zhi Hai [Mr. Zheng Xiaoyu: Disaster of Drugs] (CCTV
Weekly television broadcast Jan. 29, 2007), transcript available at http://news.cctv.com/
china/20070129/108011.shtml.
410. See Barboza, supra note 403. R
411. See id.
412. See id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See id.
416. Id.
417. See id.
418. See People v. Zheng Xiaoyu, available at http://www.lawyee.net/Case/Case_Dis-
play.asp?RID=194443&KeyWord= (SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. July 7, 2007).  Kangyu Phar-
maceutical acted less discretely, simply giving Zheng’s son a check for 1 million Hong
Kong Dollars ($132,000).  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Zheng directed SFDA staff to approve
Kangyu’s application for a new drug.  Other drug companies followed suit, giving money
or villas to Zheng’s wife and son in exchange for SFDA’s approval of an increasing num-
ber of drugs, medical equipment, and import quotas.
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GMP certification is an important production enforcement tool in
securing food safety.  But Mr. Zheng’s case demonstrates that ensuring
GMP implementation in China’s food and drug industries is virtually
impossible.  Sanlu and other milk processors that produced melamine
tainted products were all GMP certified firms.  Without rigorous follow-up
testing and auditing by truly impartial and incorruptible agencies, GMP is
nothing but a commercial tool to deceive consumers.
Ironically, China has the most serious penalties in the world for taking
bribes, yet suffers some of the worst corruption problems among the
world’s leading economies.419  The apparent reason is that the death pen-
alty has not produced the kind of deterrence that the Chinese government
desired because the government has not enforced its laws equally and con-
sistently.420  Both the judiciary and prosecutors lack independent author-
ity and only act under the direction of the Party and government
officials.421  When high ranking officials are caught for taking bribes, they
are often administratively disciplined rather than criminally prosecuted.422
Occasionally, some officials are prosecuted and convicted, but are sent to
special prisons with comfortable amenities.423  This arbitrary and capri-
cious manner of prosecution has created political rents for officials, such
as Mr. Zheng, and thus incentivizes them to game the system.  Mr. Zheng’s
luck simply ran out because of the frequent food and drug scandals in
which people died after consuming tainted food and drug products
approved by the SFDA under his watch.424  The Chinese government did
not treat Mr. Zheng’s case as an ordinary criminal matter; rather, it used
his execution as a statement to the world underscoring its seriousness
about food safety.425
Despite Zheng’s execution, corruption problems have continued to
plague quality and safety systems.  A New York Times article commented:
Industry analysts say Beijing will have to do a great deal more to solve the
country’s food and drug safety problems.  “If the head of the drug agency is
corrupt,” said James J. Shen, a longtime industry analyst in Beijing and the
publisher of Pharma China, “you can imagine how corrupt the whole system
is.”426
419. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 394. R
420. See Eric Pederson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its Application to U.S.
Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13, 27 (2008).
421. See Stephen L. McPherson, Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: The Path to
Judicial Independence in China, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 787, 798 (2008).
422. See Mr. Wang Yong’s Speech, infra note 427. R
423. See Nanping Liu, Trick or Treat: Legal Reasoning in the Shadow of Corruption in
the People’s Republic of China, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 179, 182– 84 & nn. 12– 17.
424. See Barboza, supra note 403. R
425. See Joseph Kahn, China Quick to Execute Drug Official, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/business/worldbusiness/11execute.
html?ref=business; Zhu Zhe, Ex-Official Gets Death for Graft, CHINA DAILY, May 30, 2007,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-05/30/content_882994.htm.
426. Barboza, supra note 403. R
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Unsurprisingly, Mr. Wang, director of AQSIQ, acknowledged that cor-
ruption still poses serious challenges in winning public trust.  He revealed
that from 2003 to 2008, 829 quality inspection officials were administra-
tively disciplined, with 199 of them subject to criminal prosecution on cor-
ruption charges.427  In 2009, AQSIQ administratively disciplined 105
officials, 40 of them subject to criminal prosecution on corruption
charges.428  In April 2010, Mr. Wei Liang and four other SFDA high offi-
cials were arrested on corruption charges.429  Critics commented that Mr.
Zheng’s execution apparently failed to provide effective deterrence.430
3. Fragmented Food Industry and Unethical Practices
China’s fragmented food industry also poses serious challenges to the
implementation of the FSL.  Despite the fact that China has become the
largest exporter in the world, the Chinese food industry is still in a rudi-
mentary stage.431  The food industry is made up of over 170,000 food
processing firms, 72% of which employ fewer than ten workers.432  Accord-
ing to a recent SFDA survey of 450,000 food firms, 29% of them did not
have any production standards.433  Of the firms surveyed, 60% did not
conduct quality checks of food products nor were they even capable of con-
ducting self-inspections.434  Furthermore, nearly 50% of the firms lacked
sanitation certificates or production licenses.435  In many cases small
firms frequently changed locations to evade inspections.436  As a result, it
is almost impossible for the local government to keep track of these small
firms, let alone maintain any meaningful supervision of the food produc-
tion process.
427. Wang Yong, Dir., AQSIQ, Speech at the AQSIQ Annual Anti-Corruption Confer-
ence in Beijing: Zai Quanguo Zhijian Xitong Dangfeng Lianzheng Jianshen Gongzuo
Huiyi Shang de Jianghua [Improving the Communist Party’s Work Ethics and Building a
Clean Government in the Quality Inspection System] (Feb. 18, 2009) (transcript on file
with the author of this article).
428. Wang Yong, Dir., AQSIQ, Speech at the AQSIQ Annual Anti-Corruption Confer-
ence in Beijing: Zai Quanguo Zhijian Xitong Dangfeng Lianzheng Jianshen Gongzuo
Huiyi Shang de Jianghua [Improving the Communist Party’s Work Ethics and Building a
Clean Government in the Quality Inspection System] (Jan. 28, 2010), transcript available
at http://www.ccic.com/web/static/articles/catalog_63100/2010-03-25/article_ff8080
812760adee012793fa13520069/ff8080812760adee012793fa13520069.html.
429. Hou Yijun, Shexian Shouhui Bei Yiyao Qiye Jubao Goujia Yaojian Ju Wuren Bei
Pibu [Upon Pharmaceutical Companies Complaints, Five SFDA Officials were Arrested on
Corruption Charges], BEIJING QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY], Apr. 19, 2010, http://
bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=64955945.
430. Tong Tong, Zheng Xiaoyu Men Qianpu Huoji de Qishi [Lessons from the Repeat
Corruption Cases in the SFDA], BEIJING 431 CHENBO [BEIJING MORNING NEWS], Apr. 19, R
2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-04/19/c_1242243_2.htm.
431. Miao Junjie, Zhang Yanran, and Wang Yujuan, Zhongguo Shipin Jianguan Qiangshi
Chushou Zhongzhua Shipin Yuantao [China’s Food Safety Management Focuses on Food
Supply], Liaowang, May 23, 2007, available at http://health.sohu.com/20070522/n250
158568.shtml.
432. Ying, supra note 270. R
433. See Miao, supra note 431. R
434. See id.
435. See id.
436. Id.
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Even worse, the small food processing firms obtain supplies from hun-
dreds of millions of even smaller family-based farms, many of which are
“no larger than a basketball court.”437  China has 1.3 billion people, but it
has only 122 million hectares of arable land, or 0.27 hectares per capita,
which is 40% less than the world average, or 12.5% of the U.S. level.438
Industrialization and urban expansion have not only caused significant
shrinkage of China’s arable land but have also degraded land quality.439
As a result, China has seen a rapid decline in agricultural production in
recent years.440  To ensure higher yields from limited farmland, farmers
excessively use pesticides, fertilizers, and animal drugs including antibiot-
ics and growth hormones.441
Unsanitary and unethical practices also pose challenges to FSL imple-
mentation.  Many business owners in China are not convinced that sani-
tary requirements are worth implementing.442  The President of Hami
Food in Beijing revealed that “ ‘chilled and frozen products very often come
in taxi cabs or in vans— not under properly controlled conditions.’”443  Just
after the passage of the new FSL, a reporter from China Central Television
(CCTV) made an investigative report that revealed the dreadful conditions
under which food products were processed in small firms.444  In a covert
interview at a family-based sausage mill, a worker pointed to his legs and
told the reporter that he had just come back from working in a manure pit
without a shower.  The reporter asked him if anyone would want to buy his
sausages and the man replied, “Without knowing [what I did], people will
enjoy my sausages.”445
In addition to unsanitary conditions, unscrupulous food producers
have deliberately adulterated food with various industrial chemicals to
increase profits.  In 2005, food safety officials in Beijing ordered the
removal of duck eggs from the shelves because farmers fed the ducks with
Sudan Red I, a cancer-causing dye.446  The purpose was to give the yolks a
437. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 176, at 2. R
438. Yingling Liu, Shrinking Arable Lands Jeopardizing China’s Food Security,
WorldWatch Inst., Apr. 18, 2006, available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3912.
439. See id.
440. See id.
441. See Liu, supra note 268, at 415. R
442. See Aleda V. Roth et al., Unraveling the Food Supply Chain: Strategic Insights from
China and the 2007 Recalls, 44 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT 22, 30 (2008).
443. Id.
444. Cai Jing, Kaowen Shipin Zhiliang Haiyou Sha Neng Chi [Food Quality: What is
Left to Each?], (China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast Mar. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.39kf.com/focus/spaq/01/2009-03-11-573535.shtml.  The full transcript of
the interview is still on a few websites as of the time of this writing.  The author has a
printed copy of this interview on file.
445. Id.  In another interview, a worker at a dry tofu plant added industrial dye to
make the finished products appealing to consumers.  When asked if she would eat the
dyed tofu, the worker replied, “it is poisonous, I would never eat it.” Id.
446. Beijing Yi Chakou 37361 bottles of Heinz Tiaoweipin [Beijing Has Detained 37361
Bottles of Heinz Seasoning],  XINHUA NEWS , Mar. 17, 2005, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/17/content_2710373.htm.
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deep red color447 and deceive consumers who often believe that intensely
red yolks were more nutritious than plain ones.448  Several Kentucky Fried
Chicken (KFC) stores in China abruptly stopped selling hot wings for a
week because the hot sauces the stores purchased from a Chinese vendor
were tainted with Sudan Red I.449  Sudan Red I has been widely found in
foodstuffs across the country.450
In 2007, AQSIQ published a long list of poisonous industrial chemi-
cals that food processors had deliberately added to foods for better taste or
as preservatives.  The following list offers a few examples:451
a) Melamine added to milk to boost protein counts;
b) Hydrochloric acid and human hair, which are rich in amino acid,
added to soy sauce;
c) Tannic acid used with alcohol and water to make red wine;
d) Dichlorvos (a pesticide) added to sausage for better taste;
e) Formaldehyde added to hot pot soups for better taste;
f) Sulphur added to dry fruits as a preservative;
g) Paraffin wax as a preservative used in rice;
h) Copper sulfate used as a preservative in dry mushrooms; and
i) Clenbuterol added to pig feeds, a chemical that can turn fat into red
meat in a few weeks.
After the promulgation of the new FSL, the CCTV reports showed that
vendors continued to market illegal chemicals designed to boost protein
counts in food inspection.452
4. Environmental Degradation and the Case of Aquacultured Seafood
Another obstacle for the implementation of the new FSL is environ-
mental degradation.  A World Health Organization (WHO) expert advised
the Chinese government that implementing “from farm to table” checks is
the ultimate solution to food safety.453  However, China’s serious environ-
447. Li Huiying, Fuzhou Chahuo Han Sudanhong de “Hongxin” Jidan, Egg [Eggs Tainted
with Sudan Red Found in Fuzhou], XINHUA NEWS, Nov. 19, 2006, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-11/19/content_5350233.htm.
448. See Wu Beibei, Jidan Yingyang Jiazhi yu Danke Yanse Wuguan [Nutrition of an Egg
Has Nothing to Do with Shell Color], XINHUA NEWS , Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.sn.
xinhuanet.com/2010-01/20/content_18816571.htm.
449. Ke Huiming, Yin Han Sudan Hong Kendeji Zhihai, Baisheng Yuan Chengdan Falv
Zeren [Kentucky Fried Chicken is Liable for its Products Tainted Sudan Red], SINA NEWS,
Mar. 17, 2005, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/xiaofei/consume/20050317/160
61438808.shtml.
450. Lei Min & Liu Juhua, Woguo 30 Jia Qiye 88 Zhong Shipin Bei Chachu You Sudan
Hong [Eighty-Eight Food Products Produced by 30 Firms Are Tainted with Sudan Red],
Xinhua News, Apr. 6, 2005, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/xiaofei/puguangtai/
20050406/00041490488.shtml.
451. Cai, supra note 444. R
452. Id.
453. Chua Chin Hon, Call for “Farm to Table” Checks: Expensive Tests on End-Products
Less Effective: WHO, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.
straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_293882.html.
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mental problems make ensuring the safety of the food supply from pol-
luted farms extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible.
China’s explosive economic growth has taken a heavy toll on its envi-
ronment, largely because of a “pollute first, control later” development
model.454  In 2007, China became the world’s biggest emitter of carbon
dioxide, overtaking the United States.455  Amid the zealous pursuit for a
high GDP, local leaders have rarely considered environmental damage as a
cost.  In some regions, local governments have stretched the development
model to the extreme by claiming that people would “rather be choked [by
pollution] to death than be starved to death.”456  Because of China’s exces-
sive dependence on coal for energy, large numbers of so-called “cancer vil-
lages” have emerged, in which many villagers are struck with similar types
of cancers.457  Studies have shown that outdoor pollution has contributed
to between 300,000 and 400,000 premature deaths every year in China.458
It is estimated that air pollution alone has cost $25 billion in health and
loss of productivity costs.459  In August 2009, more than 600 children near
a metal smelter house in Shaanxi Province were found to have high levels of
heavy metals in their blood.460  The pollution was so severe that over one
hundred children required hospitalization.461  The incident prompted an
angry protest calling for compensation from the smelter.462
Industrial revolution has also had catastrophic effects on China’s
water systems.  According to a joint study by the United Nations Develop-
ment and Environment Program (UNDP) and the Chinese government,
“only five percent of household sewage and seventeen percent of industrial
waste are properly treated prior to discharge.”463  Approximately 3.7 bil-
lion tons of industrial waste and sewage are discharged daily into rivers,
454. Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Develop-
ments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 198 (2007); see also Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment:
Challenges After China’s WTO Accession, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 48– 49 (2007) (pro-
viding Table 2, which shows the correlation between trade growth and environmental
pollution).
455. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Increases Lead as Biggest Carbon Dioxide Emitter,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/world/
asia/14china.html.
456. Li Jia, Liu Junlu & Han Qing, Wuran Xiyi: Wuran Qiye Weihe Bu Choujia [Pol-
luting Factories Are Moving to the Western Region of China: Why Are They Well
Received?], XINHUA NEWS, Sept. 30, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/polit-
ics/2006-09/30/content_5158939.htm.
457. Yu Cheng, Yianhai Duoge Shengfen Zhuxian Ai Zheng Cun [“Cancer Villages”
Emerged Along Coastal Regions], Nanfang Dushi Bao, Nov. 5, 2007, available at http://
news.163.com/07/1105/16/3SI4DUL600011SM9.html.
458. Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Where Breathing is Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/opinion/25kristof.html.
459. Sitaraman, supra note 393, at 277. R
460. Protesters Storm Plant After Children Are Poisoned, Aug. 17, 2009, available at
http://www.france24.com/en/20090817-protesters-storm-plant-after-children-are-
poisoned-china-lead-school-dongling-shaanxi.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Sitaraman, supra note 393, at 280. R
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lakes and coastal waters.464  The Chinese Environmental Science Academy
reported that 80% of the 200 lakes surveyed are no longer suitable for
drinking because of industrial pollution.465  In 2006, the State Environ-
mental Protection Agency (SEPA) revealed an even bleaker outlook of the
water systems: seven of the nine lakes under its surveillance were even dan-
gerous “to human skin on contact.”466
Alarmingly, China is the largest exporter of aquacultured seafood in
the value of $8.7 billion,467 which accounts for 70% of the world’s total
production.468  China is the third largest exporter of seafood into the
United States.469  “Approximately 80% of the seafood consumed in the
U.S. is imported from approximately 62 countries.”470  Seafood from
China makes up about 21% of the total imported seafood into the United
States.471  According to Food & Water Watch, the conditions that aquacul-
tured seafood is grown under in China are deplorable: [P]roducers tightly
cram thousands of finfish and shellfish into their facilities to maximize
production.  This generates large amounts of waste, contaminates the
water, and spreads disease, which can kill off entire crops of fish if left
untreated.  Even if a disease does not kill off all the fish in an aquaculture
facility, remaining bacteria, such as Vibrio, Listeria, or Salmonella, can
sicken people who eat the fish.472
To maintain productivity in severely polluted waters, aquaculture
farmers routinely use excessive amounts of antibiotics, fungicides, and pes-
ticides, none of which would be approved by either the Chinese or U.S.
government.473  The U.S. FDA has concluded that the unapproved chemi-
cals used by the Chinese aquaculture farms, such as malachite green, nitro-
furans, fluoroquinolones, and gentian are carcinogenic.474  An FDA report
stated, “The presence of antibiotic residues may contribute to an increase
of antimicrobial resistance in human pathogens.”475  In addition to animal
drugs and pesticides, farmers feed fish and shrimp substances such as
melamine, vitamin C, contraceptive drugs, fertilizers, and olaquindox in
464. Food & Water Watch, supra note 7, at 5. R
465. Li Jing, Fu Yingyang Hua Weixie Woguo Hubo Shengtai Anquan [Eutrophication
Threatens Ecological Condition of Lakes in China], CHINA DAILY, March, 31, 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/zgzx/2009-03/31/content_7635373.htm.
466. Sun Xiaohua, Ban Slapped on Polluting Cities, Zones, CHINA DAILY, July 4, 2007,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/04/content_909239.htm.
467. David Barboza, China Says Its Seafood Is Now Safer and Better, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2008, at C3.
468. FDA IMPORT ALERTS, supra note 2. R
469. Id.
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471. Food & Water Watch, supra note 7, at 2. R
472. Id. at 5.
473. Wu Milu & Tan Na, Jiekai Yuye Yangzhi Heimu: Du Shiliao Chuifei Yuxia [Piercing
the Black Veil of Aquaculture Farming: Using Toxic Feeds to Increase Fish and Shrimps
Production], Beijing Keji Bao [Beijing Sci. & Tech. Daily], Apr. 7, 2009, available at http:/
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order to increase production while saving feed costs.476  In April 2009, the
local government was alerted to the use of olaquindox in the feed only after
farmers reported large numbers of dead fish.477
VI. Comparative Perspectives: Hong Kong and Japan
Hong Kong imports 95% of its food supply, the bulk coming from
China.478  While food scandals break out frequently in China, Hong Kong
has kept a nearly impeccable food safety record.  The measures that the
Hong Kong government take to protect the public from deleterious
imported food may provide some lessons to the United States.479  First,
Hong Kong allocates considerable resources to screening Chinese imports.
The government not only conducts visual inspections but also conducts
tests on samples of imports checking for microbiological or chemical con-
taminations at the Hong Kong government’s laboratories.480  For example,
vegetables are tested for pesticide residues.481  Second, Hong Kong only
imports eggs, chickens and vegetables from farms and processing plants
that have registered with the Hong Kong government.482  Moreover, Hong
Kong sends inspectors to audit the registered farms and plants to ensure
compliance.483  Third, Hong Kong designates ports for import entry
according to product type; for example there is a fish port and a vegetable
port.  Through specialization, the government can efficiently allocate
resources to maximize the effect of border inspections.484
Japan imports more foods from China than the United States.485
Japan samples and tests about 15% of food imports from China,486 while
the FDA only tests 1% of imported foods.  Like Hong Kong, Japan only
imports food from a small number of process plants and farms in China.
For example, only 36 processing plants are qualified to ship processed
chickens to Japan.487  Moreover, the Japanese government sends food
safety officials to inspect those processing plants and farms annually.488
In addition to the rigorous physical inspections at their ports of entry,
Hong Kong and Japan have taken a systematic approach to selecting and
auditing processing plants and farms.  In contrast, the “ ‘FDA often has very
limited information regarding conditions under which most food is pro-
476. Wu & Tan, supra note 473. R
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485. Martin Fackler, Safe Food for Japan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2007, at C1, available at
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duced in foreign countries.’”489  Experts predict that the United States will
not adopt either the Hong Kong or Japanese model because the costs for
additional inspections and audits would be prohibitively expensive for U.S.
groceries.490  Besides, American consumers would most likely be unwilling
to pay for additional regulatory costs.491  For this precise reason, the Gro-
cery Manufacturers Association (GMA) has avidly lobbied the government
to avoid any increase in import inspections.492
Conclusion: Some Thoughts on Regulatory Costs, Adverse Selection
and Food Safety
There are three approaches for securing food safety in the U.S.: (1)
increase inspections at the borders by utilizing traditional outcome-based
enforcement tools; (2) certify and inspect foreign food facilities, utilizing
production-based enforcement tools on exports to the U.S.; and (3) reduce
imports by increasing domestic production.  The use of outcome- and
enforcement-based tools has proven effective in the domestic context, but
applying similar methods to imported food will invariably increase costs
for importers and retailers.  The FDA is unwilling to incur such costs on
imported foods because doing so would hinder international trade.493
Part of the FDA’s reluctance to impede trade is due to the successful lobby-
ing efforts of the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA).494  The GMA
is adamantly against both named enforcement choices because the subse-
quent rise in regulatory costs will reduce profits.  The result is that the
Agreement with China on food safety wholeheartedly embraces the GMA’s
wishes to outsource regulatory power to China.  As analyzed in Part IV,
however, the Chinese government is not capable of handling this task
because of inherent flaws in its food safety regulatory framework.  In addi-
tion, environmental degradation now threatens China’s raw food supply.
Therefore, the most sensible approach to ensuring food safety in the
United States is to increase domestic production.  This approach, however,
is difficult to implement, because it largely hinges on consumer demand.
Without knowing the conditions under which imported foods are grown
and processed, consumers naturally opt for the cheapest products.495
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When domestic food manufacturers are subject to more frequent inspec-
tions and other regulatory costs, they find it impossible to compete with
imported foods subject to little or no regulatory oversight.  For example,
Louisiana shrimpers sustained substantial financial losses when importers
placed mislabeled low quality Chinese shrimp in the U.S. market.496  As
consumers are incapable of telling differences from appearance, their unin-
formed demand for inferior imported foods drives high quality domestic
foods out of the market.  According to George Akerlof, a Nobel Prize win-
ning economist, this phenomenon is called “adverse selection.”497
When market failure occurs because of “adverse selection,” govern-
mental intervention is imperative to protect consumer welfare.498  With
regard to food safety, governmental intervention means effective use of
both outcome- and production-based enforcement tools.  Unwisely, the
FDA’s action plan runs contrary to established wisdom by moving away
from traditional enforcement tools and outsourcing regulatory power to
China.  While recent food scares caused by domestically produced foods
frustrated U.S. consumers, they have yet to fully realize that U.S. food
safety problems pale in comparison to those in China.
Consequently, there is no shortcut to food safety.  Utilizing traditional
outcome- and production-based enforcement tools for imported foods is
the only way to ensure food safety.  Regulatory costs are inevitable.  In this
regard, Japan and Hong Kong have set a good example for the United States
by not only frequently inspecting imports, but also certifying Chinese food
facilities.  When the FDA implements direct supervision over imported
foods, the rising regulatory costs will force importers to be vigilant about
selecting supply sources and increased food safety will result.  Greater reg-
ulatory expenditures will also put domestic foods on an equal footing with
imported foods in terms of market competition.  The simple truth is that
with lax governmental regulation, producers under-invest in food safety.
Consequently, regulatory power over food safety cannot be delegated.
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Apr. 4, 2009.
497. See Akerlof, supra note 495, at 488– 500. R
498. See id.
